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Entities treated as partnerships for tax purposes cover the spectrum from small 
Mom and Pop operations to mammoth enterprises owned by sophisticated partners.  
Designing tax law to govern this diverse array of entities is a challenging exercise since 
rules that are well suited to provide simplicity for entities at the small, unsophisticated 
end of the continuum may be poorly designed for preventing manipulation by entities at 
the large, sophisticated end of the continuum.  However, a careful examination of how 
tax rules can best promote simplicity reveals opportunities for reform that would make 
the law more appropriate for entities all along the continuum.     
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INTRODUCTION 
In the context of partnership tax, one frequently repeated storyline involves 
sophisticated parties exploiting rules designed to accommodate the needs of Mom and 
Pop partnerships.  For example, in the 1990s, a subsidiary of General Electric Capital 
Corporation (“GECC”) undertook a transaction to shift the tax consequences of $310 
million of taxable income from itself to parties not subject to tax on the income, reducing 
total tax paid by $62 million.  The transaction did not involve shifting economic income 
from GECC‟s subsidiary to the parties not subject to tax and involved minimal economic 
risk.  The parties‟ tax advisors crafted the transaction in order to take advantage of a tax 
provision that was designed to serve the needs of unsophisticated partners, as discussed in 
detail later in this paper.
1
  Often transactions like this provoke responses from Congress 
or the Treasury designed to prevent taxpayers from undertaking similar transactions in 
the future.  The responses of lawmakers invariably further complicate partnership tax 
law. 
In 1954, when Congress enacted Subchapter K (the part of the Internal Revenue 
Code (“Code”) that governs the taxation of partners and partnerships),2 Congress was 
aware of the fact that many small, unsophisticated entities were treated as partnerships for 
                                                             
1 TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).  The mechanics of the transaction, 
in the context of a simplified version of the facts of the actual case, are described below.  See infra note 29.  
The Service challenged the transaction arguing, among other things, that the parties to whom the taxable 
income was allocated were not really partners since they bore very limited economic risk.  Most recently, the 
District Court, on remand, held in favor of the taxpayer.  TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 2d 
367 (D. Conn. 2009).  
2 In this paper, I use the term “partnership” to refer to an entity treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes.  Even if an entity is treated, for example, as a limited liability company for purposes of business 
organization law, it could be treated as a partnership for tax purposes provided that it has two or more 
owners, it has not elected to be treated as a corporation for tax purposes, and it is not required to be treated as 
a corporation under the publicly traded partnership rules or any other provision.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2 (as amended in 2006).  






  Even today, many partnerships are small entities.
4
  Thus, lawmakers 
designing rules to govern partnerships have justifiably expressed concern for the ability 
of small, unsophisticated partnerships to apply complex rules.  However, as transactions 
like the one described in the preceding paragraph demonstrate, undue focus on the needs 
of unsophisticated partnerships leads to rules that are ripe for manipulation by 
sophisticated taxpayers.  Moreover, it is not that sophisticated taxpayers use partnerships 
for only tax-motivated transactions.  Sophisticated taxpayers also use partnerships to 
carry out transactions motivated by genuine economic goals and large partnerships earn 
significant income.
5
  Use of large partnerships has grown, in part, because many hedge 
funds, real-estate funds, and private-equity funds are organized as partnerships for tax 
purposes.  In addition, in recent years, sponsors that manage such funds, including 
Blackstone, Fortress, and KKR, publicly offered interests in entities treated as 
partnerships for tax purposes.
6
  The entities are entitled to receive a portion of the 
economic return that the sponsors receive from the funds that they manage.
7
    
As a result of the varied use of partnerships, lawmakers are left with the 
unenviable task of crafting law that can simultaneously address the needs of 
unsophisticated partnerships, evolve to combat abuses attempted by sophisticated 
partnerships, and provide flexibility demanded by sophisticated partnerships operating 
legitimate businesses.
8
  In response to the predicaments that lawmakers face when 
attempting to accommodate the needs of diverse partnerships, other scholars have 
suggested bifurcating the law applicable to partnerships.  Under such proposals, a 
simplified version of current law would be available only to uncomplicated partnerships, 
and a more complex version of current law (or, under some variations of the proposal, the 
rules that currently apply to corporations) would be imposed on all other partnerships.
9
   
                                                             
3 Thus, for example, the Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying the adoption of 
Subchapter K observed that uncertainty in partnership tax was “particularly unfortunate” given the large 
number of partnerships and given that “the partnership form is much more commonly employed by small 
businesses and in farming operations than the corporate form.”  S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954).  See also 
Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229, 235–36 (1998) 
(discussing how the use of partnerships has changed substantially since 1954 when “the prototypical 
partnership was seen as a small, simple enterprise”). 
4 For example, in 2003, 93% of entities treated as partnerships for tax purposes each individually 
earned less than $1,000,000 of business receipts.  See Table 2.--Number of Businesses, Business Receipts, Net 
Income, Deficit, and Other Selected Items, by Form of Business, Industry, and Business Receipt Size, Tax 
Year 2003, I.R.S., Statistics of Income Division,  http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03ot2busbr.xls (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2011).  
5 For example, in 2003, only 5.5% of business receipts earned by all tax partnerships was earned by 
tax partnerships that each, individually, earned less than $1,000,000.  Id.  
6 The entities avoid treatment as corporations for tax purposes under I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2010) 
(treating certain publicly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes) by complying with I.R.C. 
§ 7704(c) (2010) (setting forth an exception for certain publicly traded partnerships if 90% or more of their 
gross income consists of specified types of qualifying income). 
7 For further discussion of the changing use of partnerships, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF 
THE UNCORPORATION (2010).  See also Kwall, supra note 3.  
8 Partnerships are not unique in this regard.  However, the challenges faced in the partnership tax 
context may be more pronounced because opportunities for abuse are plentiful under a set of tax rules that 
provide for pass-through taxation (unlike the tax rules that apply to C corporations) and allow for flexible 
economic arrangements (unlike the tax rules that apply to S corporations). 
9 See, e.g., George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141 
(1999).  See also Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 105 (1991) (proposing 
restructuring the taxation of entities so that all large businesses (determined based on gross revenues) would 





In this paper, I propose more modest reform within the confines of one body of 
law applicable to all partnerships.
10
  I argue that useful improvement can be achieved 
within one set of rules because there are revisions that can simplify the law (making it 
more suitable for unsophisticated partnerships) and, at the same time, make the law more 
accurate and, as a consequence, less susceptible to manipulation by sophisticated 
partnerships. 
It may seem surprising that there are opportunities to simultaneously make the 
law more suitable for unsophisticated partnerships and make the law less prone to 
exploitation by sophisticated partnerships.  Yet, such opportunities exist.  They exist 
because certain provisions that are intended to make the law simpler for unsophisticated 
partnerships, in fact, make the law more complicated, as an examination of theories 
related to legal and tax complexity will demonstrate.   
In the rest of the paper, I will elaborate upon the points described above, using 
two specific tax provisions as examples.
11
  Part I describes the first specific provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code, § 704(c), a provision that governs tax allocations made with 
respect to contributed property.  Part II discusses the history of § 704(c) and how concern 
about complexity and unsophisticated partners affected the evolution of § 704(c).  Part III 
describes the second specific provision, § 754, a provision that addresses certain 
adjustments made to a partnership‟s basis in its assets.  Part IV discusses the history of 
§ 754 and how concern about imposing burdensome requirements on unsophisticated 
partners influenced the development of § 754.  Part V discusses how reforms would make 
partnership tax law less susceptible to manipulation by sophisticated partnerships.  Part 
VI examines considerations that should inform an understanding of what constitutes 
complexity.  Part VII applies the considerations discussed in Part VI in order to 
demonstrate that the proposed reforms would simplify the law in some respects (and, in 
other respects, make it no more complex), resulting in law that is more suitable for 
unsophisticated partnerships.  Part VIII concludes the paper. 
I. EXISTING LAW UNDER § 704(c) 
Section 704(c) is a provision that governs how partners share tax items that a 
partnership recognizes with respect to certain assets.  Section 704(c) applies to two 
different types of property.  First, § 704(c) applies to property contributed to a partnership 
at a time when the value of the property is greater than (or less than) the contributing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
be taxed like corporations and all small businesses would be subject to a pass-through taxation system); Mark 
P. Gergen, The End of the Revolution in Partnership Tax?, 56 SMU L. REV. 343, 345 (2003) (“[Professor 
Yin] proposes the creation of a simplified pass-through regime – call it K-lite – along the lines of current 
subchapter S….Whatever its precise contours, once K-lite is available, we may demand more from entities 
that opt for the freedom of K-heavy.”).  Along similar lines, recent reports have indicated that the current 
administration may propose reforms under which certain businesses that earn more than $50 million in gross 
receipts would no longer be eligible for treatment as partnerships for tax purposes and, instead, would be 
treated as corporations for tax purposes.  See, e.g., Kim Dixon, U.S. Mulls Making More Firms Pay 
Corporate, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42856826/ns/business-us_business/ (last visited May 9, 2011). 
10 This approach avoids practical difficulties inherent in the bifurcation approach, such as selecting 
a proxy to accurately distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated partnerships.  In addition, this 
approach may be more feasible in that it would involve less drastic reform.  The fact that this approach would 
be less disruptive is particularly appealing given the large number of entities treated as partnerships for tax 
purposes.   
11 Other examples could include current law regarding the treatment of the transferor of a 
partnership interest. 




partner‟s tax basis in the property.  The contributing partner generally does not recognize 
the existing built-in gain (or existing built-in loss) at the time of the contribution.  When 
the partnership later sells the property (or recognizes other tax items, such as 
depreciation, with respect to the property), § 704(c) requires that the partners share tax 
gain or loss (or other tax items) in a way that takes into account the built-in gain (or built-
in loss) that existed when the property was contributed to the partnership.  Second, if a 
new partner joins a partnership at a time when the partnership‟s existing assets contain 
built-in gains or built-in losses and the partnership revalues its assets to reflect the fact 
that the new partner buys into the partnership based on the current value of the 
partnership‟s assets, § 704(c)12 requires that the partners share future tax gain or loss (or 
other tax items) recognized by the partnership in a way that takes into account the built-in 
gain (or built-in loss) that existed in the partnership‟s assets at the time the new partner 
joined the partnership.  This Part will describe the mechanics of § 704(c) in detail.    
When a partner contributes property to a partnership, the partner and the 
partnership generally do not recognize any gain or loss for tax purposes as a result of the 
contribution.
13
  In order to demonstrate, assume the following facts: 
 
Example 1.  An individual, A, owns a piece of 
land that A acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The 
value of the land has increased over time so that the land 
is currently worth $15,000.  A and B, another individual, 
form an entity that is treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes.  A contributes the land and B contributes 
$15,000 cash to this newly formed AB partnership, each 
in exchange for a 50% interest in the AB partnership.   
Under the facts of Example 1, A will not be required to recognize (and 
potentially pay tax on) the $10,000 built-in gain that exists in the land at the time of the 
contribution.
14
  However, in order to ensure that the $10,000 built-in gain is preserved to 
potentially be recognized at a future point in time, the AB partnership will obtain a tax 
basis in the land equal to $5,000 (A‟s basis in the land),15 and A will obtain a tax basis in 
A‟s interest in the partnership equal to $5,000 (A‟s basis in the land).16  As a result, if A 
sold his or her interest in the partnership for $15,000 after the contribution, A would 
recognize $10,000 of tax gain, and if the AB partnership sold the land for $15,000 after 
the contribution, the AB partnership would recognize $10,000 of tax gain.  Moreover, a 
partnership does not itself pay tax at an entity level on income recognized by the 
partnership but, rather, allocates items of taxable income, gain, loss and deduction among 
its partners so that its partners will take such items into account for purposes of 
                                                             
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (as amended in 2010).  Allocations in this context are sometimes 
referred to as “reverse § 704(c)” allocations. 
13 I.R.C. § 721 (2010). 
14 I.R.C. § 721(a) (2010). 
15 I.R.C. § 723 (2010). 
16 I.R.C. § 722 (2010). 





computing their taxable income.
17
  Consequently, this $10,000 of tax gain recognized by 
the partnership would be allocated to the partners.
18
     
Regarding how the $10,000 tax gain would be allocated, § 704(c)(1)(A) 
provides: 
[I]ncome, gain, loss and deduction with respect to property 
contributed to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among the 
partners so as to take account of the variation between the basis of the 




In other words, under the facts of Example 1, if the AB partnership sells the land 
for $15,000 so that the AB partnership recognizes $10,000 of tax gain, the $10,000 tax 
gain must be allocated between A and B in a manner that takes into account the 
difference between the basis of the land ($5,000) and the fair market value of the land 
($15,000) at the time A contributed the land to the partnership.
20
  Section 704(c)(1)(A) 
leaves to the Treasury Regulations the task of specifying how allocations should take into 
account built-in gain or built-in loss that exists in property at the time at which it is 
contributed to a partnership.
21
  
The Treasury Regulations under § 704(c) provide that allocations must be made 
using a “reasonable method” that is consistent with the purpose of § 704(c).  This 
purpose, according to the Treasury Regulations, is to “prevent the shifting of tax 
consequences among partners with respect to precontribution gain or loss.”22  The 
Treasury Regulations describe three methods that are “generally reasonable.”23  These 
three methods are the “traditional method,” the “traditional method with curative 
allocations,” and the “remedial method.”24  The Treasury Regulations do not require that 
partnerships use any particular method and, in fact, the Treasury Regulations provide that 
a partnership may use different methods with respect to different items of contributed 
property as long as the “overall method or combination of methods are reasonable based 
on the facts and circumstances and consistent with the purpose of section 704(c).”25  
                                                             
17 I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (2010). 
18 Likewise, if the value of the land had declined in value over time prior to the contribution so that, 
while A acquired the land for $25,000, the land was worth $15,000 at the time of the contribution, A would 
not be allowed to recognize the $10,000 built-in loss that existed in the land at the time of the contribution.  
I.R.C. § 721 (2010).  In order to preserve the built-in loss, the AB partnership would obtain a tax basis in the 
land equal to $25,000 (A‟s basis in the land), and A would obtain a tax basis in A‟s interest in the partnership 
equal to $25,000 (A‟s basis in the land).  I.R.C. §§ 722, 723 (2010).  As a result, if A sold his or her interest 
in the partnership for $15,000 after the contribution, A would recognize $10,000 of tax loss, and if the AB 
partnership sold the land for $15,000 after the contribution, the AB partnership would recognize $10,000 of 
tax loss to be allocated to A.  I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C) (2010). 
19I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (2010). 
20 If, instead of land, a partner contributes depreciable property to a partnership, § 704(c) also 
governs the allocation of tax depreciation deductions with respect to the property with the same goal of 
preventing a shift of tax consequences among partners with respect to pre-contribution gain or loss.  See infra 
note 29. 
21 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (2010). 
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) (2010). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(2) (2010). 




Finally, the Treasury Regulations contain an anti-abuse rule, discussed in more detail 
below, that places some constraints on the flexibility afforded by the Regulations.
26
            
In order to illustrate the operation of the three methods, we return to the facts of 
Example 1 set forth above.  If the partnership sells the land for at least $15,000, each of 
the three methods under § 704(c) would lead to the same result.  Assume, for example, 
that the AB partnership sells the land for $20,000 one year after the partnership was 
formed, and two years after selling the land, the AB partnership liquidates and distributes 
the cash that it holds ($35,000) equally ($17,500 each) to A and B.  When the partnership 
sells the land for $20,000, the partnership recognizes tax gain of $15,000 (the excess of 
the selling price over the partnership‟s $5,000 basis in the land).  Regardless of which of 
the three § 704(c) methods is used, the AB partnership will allocate this $15,000 tax gain 
as follows: $12,500 to A and $2,500 to B.  The $12,500 of tax gain allocated to A 
represents the $10,000 of gain that accrued while the land was held by A prior to 
contributing the land to the partnership plus A‟s 50% share of the $5,000 gain that 
accrued after the land was contributed to the partnership.  The $2,500 of tax gain 
allocated to B represents B‟s 50% share of the $5,000 gain that accrued after the land was 
contributed to the partnership.  Finally, each partner‟s basis in his or her interest in the 
partnership is increased by the amount of tax gain allocated to that partner upon sale of 
the land,
27
 resulting in a $17,500 basis for each partner.  Consequently, A and B do not 
recognize gain or loss as a result of receiving a $17,500 cash distribution on liquidation 
since the amount of the cash distribution received by each partner equals each partner‟s 
basis in his or her interest in the partnership.
28
  
As described above, the results under § 704(c) are not affected by the method 
elected by a partnership if the contributed land appreciated in value prior to the 
contribution and the partnership sells the land for an amount at least equal to the land‟s 
value at the time of contribution.  However, if the land appreciated in value prior to 
contribution and the partnership sells the land for an amount less than the land‟s value at 
the time of the contribution, the tax results will depend on which method the partnership 
elects to use for making § 704(c) allocations with respect to the land, and use of the 
remedial method most reliably ensures that tax consequences will not be shifted from the 
contributing partner to other partners.  Moreover, while partners do not expect land to 
decrease in value after it is contributed to a partnership, the value of contributed land 
often declines – a fact of which many real estate partnerships were reminded in the recent 
economic downturn.  Furthermore, in the case of depreciable property, the method 
elected by the partnership can affect the allocation of depreciation deductions even if the 
value of the property does not decline, and in this area as well, the remedial method most 
consistently guarantees that tax consequences will not be shifted from the contributing 
partner to a non-contributing partner.
29
   
                                                             
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) (2010). 
27 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
28 I.R.C. § 731(a) (2010). 
29 This can be illustrated with an example that is a simplified version of the facts of Castle 
Harbour.  TIFD III-E, Inc. v. U.S. (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).  Assume T and TE form an 
entity that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes.  T is subject to U.S. tax on income allocated to T from 
the partnership, but TE is not subject to U.S. tax on income allocated to TE from the partnership.  T 
contributes airplanes to the partnership.  The airplanes are depreciable.  At the time of the contribution, the 
airplanes are worth $1,000, but the airplanes have a tax basis of $100.  Furthermore, the airplanes have a 
remaining depreciation recovery period of one year.  TE contributes $1 of cash to the partnership.  The 





In order to demonstrate the impact of the particular § 704(c) method elected in a 
case in which the value of appreciated land declines after contribution to a partnership, 
assume the following facts: 
 
Example 1A.  An individual, A, owns a piece of 
land that A acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The 
value of the land has increased over time so that the land 
is currently worth $15,000.  A and B, another individual, 
form an entity that is treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes.  A contributes the land and B contributes 
$15,000 cash to this newly formed AB partnership, each 
in exchange for a 50% interest in the AB partnership.  
As a result of the contribution, A does not recognize any 
tax gain.
30
  Following the contribution, the partnership‟s 
basis in the land is $5,000,
31
  A‟s basis in his or her 
interest in the partnership is $5,000,
32
 and B‟s basis in 
his or her interest in the partnership is $15,000.
33
  One 
                                                                                                                                                                      
partnership leases the airplanes to a third party and earns $1,000 of rental income for one year.  The 
partnership sells the airplanes for $0 and liquidates in year 10. Assume the partnership agrees that, for 
purposes of determining the partners‟ book capital accounts that will measure the amount each partner is 
entitled to receive on liquidation of the partnership, all book income and loss will be allocated 99% to TE and 
1% to T.  In year 1, the book items that are allocated 99% to TE and 1% to T consist of: (1) book depreciation 
of $1,000 (measured as: $1,000 beginning book value of airplanes x ($100 tax depreciation/$100 beginning 
tax basis of airplanes) per Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3)) and (2) $1,000 of rent received.  Thus, on net 
$0 of book gain is allocated 99% ($0) to TE and 1% ($0) to T.  Consequently, capital account balances of T 
and TE remain $1,000 for T (T‟s initial capital account balance since T contributed property worth $1,000) 
and $1 for TE (TE‟s initial capital account balance since TE contributed $1 of cash) at the end of year 1.  As 
a result, even though 99% of book items are allocated to TE, when the partnership distributes the $1,001 of 
cash that it holds on liquidation, TE receives $1 and T receives $1,000.  Regarding the allocation of tax items 
in year 1, if the partnership uses the traditional method for making § 704(c) allocations with respect to the 
airplanes (as the taxpayer did in Castle Harbour), the results will be as follows.  First, because $1,000 of 
book income attributable to rent received by the partnership is allocated 99% to TE and 1% to T, $1,000 of 
taxable income recognized by the partnership as a result of rent received by the partnership will be allocated 
99% ($990) to TE and 1% ($10) to T.  Second, because $1,000 of book depreciation is allocated $990 to TE 
and $10 to T, tax depreciation from the airplanes would be allocated in the same manner if it was available.  
However, the only tax depreciation available is $100, which is allocated in its entirety to TE to get as close as 
possible to matching the allocation of book depreciation.  Thus, in total, taxable income is allocated $890 to 
TE who is not subject to tax and $10 to T.  If the partnership instead uses the remedial method for making 
§ 704(c) allocations with respect to the airplanes, for one thing, book depreciation of the airplanes would be 
spread over a longer period of time per Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(2).  Also, the partnership would invent 
notional tax items of depreciation to match book depreciation allocated to TE and equal, offsetting notional 
tax items of operating income from the airplanes to allocate to T.  For the sake of simplicity, if we focus on 
the second modification made by the remedial method, then total tax items allocated in year 1 would be: $0 to 
TE (which consists of $990 of rental income, $100 of actual tax depreciation, and $890 of notional tax 
depreciation) and $900 to T (which consists of $10 of actual rental income and $890 of notional operating 
income from the airplanes).  Consequently, T‟s taxable income effectively equals $1000 of rental income 
minus $100 of remaining tax depreciation on the airplanes, and no taxable income is shifted from T (who is 
subject to tax) to TE (who is not subject to tax).  If both modifications made by the remedial method are 
applied, then even under the remedial method, some taxable income could be shifted temporarily from T to 
TE, but the shift would be less drastic than what occurs under the traditional method. 
30 I.R.C. § 721(a) (2010). 
31 I.R.C. § 723 (2010). 
32 I.R.C. § 722 (2010). 
33 Id. 




year after the partnership was formed, the AB 
partnership sells the land for $10,000.  Two years after 
selling the land, the AB partnership distributes the cash 
that it holds ($25,000) equally to A and B ($12,500 
each).   
The results under each of the § 704(c) methods are described below. 
A. Traditional Method 
Under the facts of Example 1A, because the partnership‟s basis in the land is 
$5,000, the partnership recognizes $5,000 of tax gain upon sale of the land for $10,000.  
If the partnership uses the traditional method for allocating items under § 704(c) with 
respect to the land, $5,000 of tax gain will be allocated to A and no tax gain or loss will 
be allocated to B. 
In effect, use of the traditional method, under the facts of Example 1A, results in 
a shift from A to B of $2,500 of the $10,000 tax gain attributable to the increase in value 
of the land that occurred while it was owned by A.  Prior to A‟s contribution of the land, 
the land increased in value by $10,000 (to $15,000), and A benefited economically from 
that increase in value in its entirety because A was able to exchange the land for a 50% 
interest in a partnership that held assets worth $30,000.  Subsequent to A‟s contribution 
of the land to the AB partnership, the value of the land declined by $5,000.  Because A 
and B share the economic benefits and burdens of the AB partnership equally, this 
decline in value will be shared equally by A and B ($2,500 each), so that, for example, 
when the partnership distributes the cash that it holds ($25,000) in liquidation, each of A 
and B receive $12,500 ($2,500 less than the value that each contributed to the 
partnership).  Consequently, if A and B were each allocated taxable gain and loss in an 
amount that matched economic gain and loss, A would be allocated $10,000 of tax gain 
from sale of the land and $2,500 of tax loss from sale of the land (or $7,500 of tax gain 
from sale of the land on net), and B would be allocated $2,500 of tax loss from sale of the 
land.  However, because the only tax item recognized by the partnership as a result of 
sale of the land is $5,000 of tax gain, $5,000 of tax gain is allocated to A to get as close 
as possible to the result described above, while using only tax items actually recognized 
by the partnership from sale of the land.
34
  Compared to what should have been allocated 
to the partners based on their economic gain and loss, A is allocated $2,500 less tax gain 
than what A should have been allocated, and B is allocated $2,500 less tax loss than what 
B should have been allocated.  In effect, $2,500 of tax gain has been inappropriately 
shifted from A to B.
35
    
Moreover, while this shift may be temporary, it can, nevertheless, significantly 
affect the tax consequences experienced by A and B.  After the allocation of the $5,000 
tax gain from sale of the land to A, A‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership will 
                                                             
34 Limiting the partnership to using tax items actually recognized from sale of the land is called the 
“ceiling rule.”  Abiding by the “ceiling rule” is the distinguishing feature of the traditional method. 
35 This shift occurs because the $5,000 tax gain recognized by the partnership is effectively the net 
result of the $10,000 of gain that accrued prior to contribution of the land and the $5,000 of loss that accrued 
after contribution of the land.  Netting the two figures results in $2,500 of the tax gain attributable to the pre-
contribution increase in value of the land that economically benefited A offsetting the portion of the tax loss 
attributable to the post-contribution decline in value of the land that economically burdened B. 







 and B‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership will remain 
$15,000.  If the partnership distributes $12,500 cash to each of A and B in liquidation of 
the partnership, A will recognize $2,500 of tax gain (the excess of $12,500 cash over A‟s 
$10,000 basis in his or her interest in the partnership), and B will recognize $2,500 of tax 
loss (the excess of B‟s $15,000 basis in his or her interest in the partnership over 
$12,500).
37
  The $2,500 tax loss recognized by B corresponds to the $2,500 tax loss from 
sale of the land that should have been but was not allocated to B at the time of the sale of 
the land, as a result of shifting $2,500 of tax gain from A to B.  Likewise, the $2,500 tax 
gain recognized by A corresponds to the $2,500 tax gain from sale of the land that should 
have been allocated to A but was instead shifted from A to B.  However, recognition of a 
$2,500 tax loss (or gain) on liquidation by B (or A) does not fully compensate for the 
earlier shift in tax gain from A to B.  For one thing, tax gain and loss from sale of the 
land could be of a different character, with different resulting tax consequences, than tax 
gain or loss recognized on liquidation.  For another, the tax loss (or gain) on liquidation 
may be recognized years later if substantial time elapses between sale of the land and 
liquidation of the partnership.
38
   
B. Traditional Method with Curative Allocations 
If the only tax item ever recognized by the partnership is the gain from sale of 
land contributed by A (as is the case under the facts of Example 1A), then the traditional 
method with curative allocations would lead to the same results as the traditional method.  
However, if the facts are complicated slightly, the two methods lead to different results.  
In order to demonstrate, assume the following set of facts: 
Example 1B.  An individual, A, owns a piece of 
land (“Land #1”) that A acquired some time ago for 
$5,000.  The value of the land has increased over time so 
that the land is currently worth $15,000.  A and B, 
another individual, form an entity that is treated as a 
partnership for tax purposes.  A contributes the land and 
B contributes $15,000 cash to this newly formed AB 
partnership, each in exchange for a 50% interest in the 
AB partnership.  As a result of the contribution, A does 
not recognize any tax gain.
39
  Following the 
contribution, the partnership‟s basis in Land #1 is 
$5,000,
40
 A‟s basis in his or her interest in the 
partnership is $5,000,
41
 and B‟s basis in his or her 
interest in the partnership is $15,000.
42
  The partnership 
uses the $15,000 cash contributed by B to acquire a 
second parcel of land (“Land #2”) for $15,000.  
Consequently, the partnership‟s basis in Land #2 is 
                                                             
36 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
37 I.R.C. § 731(a) (2010). 
38 For a more complete demonstration of the potential character and timing differences, see Tables 
7 and 8, supra Part II.C. 
39 I.R.C. § 721(a) (2010). 
40 I.R.C. § 723 (2010). 
41 I.R.C. § 722 (2010). 
42 Id. 




$15,000.  One year after the partnership was formed, the 
AB partnership sells Land #1 for $10,000.  Subsequently 
(and in the same tax year as the sale of Land #1 or in a 
subsequent tax year), the partnership sells Land #2 for 
$20,000.  Two years after selling Land #2, the AB 
partnership distributes the cash that it holds ($30,000) 
equally to A and B ($15,000 each).   
 
Under the facts of Example 1B, if the traditional method is used, the $5,000 tax 
gain that results from sale of Land #1 is allocated entirely to A, and the tax consequences 
of $2,500 of the pre-contribution increase in value of Land #1 are effectively shifted from 
A to B, as described above in connection with Example 1A.  Upon sale of Land #2, the 
partnership recognizes $5,000 of tax gain and $5,000 of economic gain.  Under the 
traditional method, because A and B share equally the $5,000 economic gain from Land 
#2,
43
 they will also share equally the $5,000 tax gain from Land #2.  After the allocation 
of $5,000 of tax gain from sale of Land #1 to A, $2,500 of tax gain from sale of Land #2 
to A and $2,500 of tax gain from sale of Land #2 to B, A‟s basis in his or her interest in 
the partnership will increase to $12,500, and B‟s basis in his or her interest in the 
partnership will increase to $17,500.
44
  When the partnership distributes $30,000 of cash 
equally to A and B on liquidation ($15,000 each), A will recognize $2,500 of tax gain 
and B will recognize $2,500 of tax loss.
45
  As discussed above, while this $2,500 amount 
corresponds to the amount of tax gain attributable to pre-contribution appreciation in the 
value of Land #1 that was shifted from A to B, recognition of tax gain and loss on 
liquidation does not fully compensate for the earlier shift because the liquidation may 
occur in a later year than the year in which the land was sold and the tax gain and loss 
recognized on liquidation may be of a different character (leading to different tax 
consequences) than tax gain and loss from sale of the land.   
If the traditional method with curative allocations is applied to the facts of 
Example 1B, the $5,000 of tax gain recognized on sale of Land #1 will be allocated in its 
entirety to A, like it was under the traditional method.  However, unlike the traditional 
method, under the traditional method with curative allocations, the $5,000 of tax gain 
recognized upon the sale of Land #2 will be allocated in its entirety to A (rather than 
being allocated $2,500 to each of A and B to match how economic gain from the sale of 
Land #2 is shared).
46
  In effect, $2,500 of tax gain from Land #2 is shifted from B to A on 
sale of Land #2 to counteract the fact that $2,500 of tax gain attributable to pre-
contribution appreciation in the value of Land #1 was shifted from A to B on sale of Land 
#1.  After the allocation of $5,000 of tax gain from sale of Land #1 to A and $5,000 of 
tax gain from sale of Land #2 to A, A‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership will 
increase to $15,000,
47
 and B‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership will remain 
$15,000.  When the partnership distributes $30,000 of cash equally to A and B on 
                                                             
43 This is because the amount each partner will receive on liquidation of the partnership is increased 
by $2,500 as a result of the fact that Land #2 is sold for a $5,000 economic gain. 
44 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2010). 
45 I.R.C. § 731(a) (2010). 
46 Allocating the tax gain from Land #2 differently than the economic gain (or, more precisely, 
“book gain,” which, in this case, is the same as economic gain) from Land #2 in order to offset the shift in tax 
gain from Land #1 is referred to as a “curative allocation.”  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(1) (2010). 
47 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A). 





liquidation ($15,000 each), A and B will not recognize tax gain or loss as a result of the 
liquidation.
48
   
In summary, rather than relying on tax gain and loss recognized on liquidation of 
the partnership to offset an earlier shift among the partners of tax gain or loss resulting 
from the sale of contributed property (like the traditional method), the traditional method 
with curative allocations utilizes tax gain and loss recognized from sale of other assets 
during the life of the partnership to adjust for a shift among the partners of tax gain or 
loss arising from the sale of contributed property.  Consequently, the traditional method 
with curative allocations potentially mitigates a shift in tax consequences attributable to 
pre-contribution appreciation or depreciation in asset value more accurately than the 
traditional method for two reasons.  First, the traditional method with curative allocations 
can potentially offset a shift of tax consequences attributable to pre-contribution change 
in asset value earlier in time.
49
  In Example 1B, this is true since the sale of Land #2 
occurs earlier than the liquidation of the partnership.  Second, whereas tax gain or loss 
recognized on liquidation may be of a different character (with different resulting tax 
consequences) than the tax gain or loss attributable to pre-contribution change in asset 
value, the Treasury Regulations require that tax gain or loss that is allocated by the 
partnership under the traditional method with curative allocations “must be expected to 
have substantially the same effect on each partner‟s tax liability” as the tax gain or loss 
attributable to pre-contribution change in asset value.
50
  In other words, the allocations 
described above are only allowed if tax gain from sale of Land #2 is of the same 
character as tax gain from sale of Land #1.   
However, the ability of the traditional method with curative allocations to more 
effectively mitigate a shift of tax consequences is limited because the partnership may 
not, in fact, recognize actual tax items that can be used to offset the shift.  Thus, as 
mentioned in connection with Example 1A above, if the partnership‟s only asset was 
Land #1 and the partnership never recognized a tax item other than the $5,000 tax gain 
recognized from sale of Land #1, the traditional method with curative allocations would 
lead to the same results as the traditional method. 
C. Remedial Method 
Unlike the traditional method, the remedial method does not rely on tax gain or 
loss recognized on liquidation of the partnership to correct for an earlier shift in tax 
consequences attributable to a pre-contribution change in asset value, and, unlike the 
traditional method with curative allocations, the remedial method does not rely on the 
allocation of actual tax items recognized by the partnership to potentially compensate for 
such a shift.  Rather, under the remedial method, the partnership invents purely fictional 
tax items of precisely the right amount and the right character to ensure that any shift in 
tax consequences attributable to a pre-contribution change in asset value is completely 
offset at the exact time that it would otherwise occur. 
                                                             
48 I.R.C. § 731(a). 
49 Regarding the timing of making curative allocations, the Treasury Regulations provide that, “the 
period of time over which the curative allocations are made is a factor in determining whether the allocations 
are reasonable.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(3)(ii) (2010). 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(3)(iii) (2010). 




In order to illustrate the operation of the remedial method, we return to the facts 
of Example 1A set forth above.  In that example, when the partnership sells the land for 
$10,000, on net, A has realized $7,500 of economic gain with respect to the land.  This 
$7,500 net economic gain can be separated into two components: (1) $10,000 of 
economic gain that accrued between the time A acquired the land for $5,000 and the time 
A exchanged the land for a 50% interest in a partnership that held assets worth $30,000 
and (2) A‟s 50% share of the $5,000 of economic loss that accrued between the time A 
contributed the land and the time the partnership sold the land.  In total, B has realized 
$2,500 of economic loss with respect to the land, which represents B‟s 50% share of the 
$5,000 economic loss that accrued after the land was contributed to the partnership.  
Therefore, if A and B were allocated tax gain and loss in connection with a sale of the 
land in an amount that precisely matched economic gain and loss realized by each 
partner, A would be allocated $7,500 of tax gain and B would be allocated $2,500 of tax 
loss.   
However, under the traditional method or the traditional method with curative 
allocations, the partnership allocates $5,000 of tax gain to A since that is the only tax 
item actually recognized by the partnership.  Thus, under these methods, A is allocated 
$2,500 less tax gain than what should be allocated to A, and B is allocated $2,500 less tax 
loss than what should be allocated to B because $2,500 of tax gain has effectively been 
shifted from A to B.   
Under the remedial method, on the other hand, the partnership invents a fictional 
item of $2,500 of tax loss from sale of the land and an equal and offsetting fictional item 
of $2,500 of tax gain from sale of the land.  In addition to allocating $5,000 of actual tax 
gain to A, the partnership allocates the $2,500 of fictional tax gain to A, so that A 
recognizes, in total, $7,500 of tax gain, an amount that precisely matches economic gain 
realized by A.  Likewise, the partnership allocates the fictional item of $2,500 of tax loss 
to B, which precisely matches economic loss realized by B.  As a result, the partnership 
shifts no tax gain from A to B.  Furthermore, because the partnership has allocated tax 
items to A and B in an amount that matches economic gain and loss realized and the 
partnership has not shifted any tax gain from one partner to the other, A and B will not 
recognize any further tax gain or loss when they each receive $12,500 of cash on 
liquidation.  In particular, after the partnership allocates: (i) $7,500 of tax gain from sale 
of the land to A and (ii) $2,500 of tax loss from sale of the land to B, A‟s basis in his or 
her interest in the partnership will increase to $12,500,
51
 and B‟s basis in his or her 
interest in the partnership will decrease to $12,500.
52
  Therefore, when the partnership 
distributes $25,000 of cash equally to A and B on liquidation ($12,500 each), A and B 
will not recognize gain or loss as a result of the liquidation.
53
   
D. Summary of § 704(c) Methods 
The results under the three methods, as shown by the examples above, are 
condensed in the following table. 
 
 
                                                             
51 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A). 
52 I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(A) (2010). 
53 I.R.C. § 731(a). 





Table 1: Summary of § 704(c) Methods 
 
 Contributed appreciated 
land sold for amount at least 
equal to value at time of 
contribution 
Contributed appreciated 
land sold for amount less 
than value at time of 
contribution 
Traditional Method No Shift of Tax 
Consequences from A to B 
Shift of Tax Consequences 
from A to B on Sale of 
Land, Mitigated to an 
Extent at Time of 
Liquidation 
Traditional Method with 
Curative Allocations 
No Shift of Tax  
Consequences from A to B 
Shift of Tax Consequences 
from A to B on Sale of 
Land, Potentially Mitigated 
to an Extent Later in Life of 
Partnership or on 
Liquidation 
Remedial Method No Shift of Tax 
Consequences from A to B 
No Shift of Tax 
Consequences from A to B 
 
 
In summary, the remedial method most reliably carries out the purpose of 
§ 704(c), namely preventing the shifting of tax consequences among partners with respect 
to pre-contribution gain or loss.
54
  In particular, unlike the other methods, the remedial 
method ensures that, regardless of the amount of actual tax items recognized by the 
partnership, no such shift will occur.   
E. Anti-Abuse Rule 
While the Treasury Regulations generally allow a taxpayer to select any 
reasonable method under § 704(c) with respect to each item of contributed property, they 
constrain flexibility to some extent by providing that: 
An allocation method (or combination of methods) is not 
reasonable if the contribution of property . . . and the corresponding 
allocation of tax items with respect to the property are made with a view 
to shifting the tax consequences of built-in gain or loss among the 
partners in a manner that substantially reduces the present value of the 
partners‟ aggregate tax liability.55 
                                                             
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1) (2010) (describing the purpose of § 704(c) (2010)). 
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) (2010).  Other constraints on the flexibility afforded by § 704(c) are 
discussed below.  See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, the remedial method has been 
used in abusive transactions (including transactions undertaken by Enron), prompting amendments to the 
Regulations under § 704(c).  Those amendments, finalized in June 2010 provide: “even though a partnership's 
allocation method may be described in the literal language of [the Regulations under § 704(c)], based on the 
particular facts and circumstances, the Commissioner can recast the contribution as appropriate to avoid tax 
results inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K.  One factor that may be considered by the Commissioner 
is the use of the remedial allocation method by related partners in which allocations of remedial items of 





Based on the language of the regulation as well as the way § 704(c) operates, it 
would appear that a partnership will not run afoul of the anti-abuse rule solely because it 
selects the § 704(c) method that leads to the most favorable tax consequences.  For one 
thing, if the contribution of a particular piece of property is taken as a given, the selection 
of one method versus another method would generally be motivated solely by the goal of 
generating the most favorable tax consequences since selecting one method instead of 
another method does not affect anything other than tax consequences.  In other words, 
once a given piece of property has been contributed, use of the traditional method instead 
of the remedial method, for example, only affects how tax items are allocated with 
respect to the property and does not affect how the partners share in any economic 
benefits and burdens associated with the property.  Therefore, if the contribution of 
property is taken as a given, the fact that the partnership opts for the traditional method 
because it might be expected to shift tax gain from a partner subject to a higher effective 
rate of tax to a partner subject to a lower effective rate of tax should not, in and of itself, 
run afoul of the anti-abuse rule.  This is so because, in every case in which the selection 
of the traditional method is based on an analysis of the consequences that will follow 
from selecting that particular method, the selection must be based on the conclusion that 
the traditional method will lead to the most favorable tax consequences since the only 
results that vary across the different methods are tax results.   For another thing, the 
Treasury Regulations state, “An allocation method is not necessarily unreasonable merely 
because another allocation method would result in a higher aggregate tax liability.”56   
Thus, instead of addressing the issue of which method is selected, it would seem 
that the anti-abuse rule envisions a situation in which shifting tax consequences to reduce 
aggregate tax liability was an important factor motivating the contributing partner to 
contribute the property to the partnership in the first place.
57
  It is not clear how 
significant the goal of reducing tax liability must have been if it was one of multiple 
motives that influenced the partner‟s decision to contribute property to the partnership.58  
It is also unclear what tax consequences should be used as a baseline for purposes of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
income, gain, loss or deduction are made to one partner and the allocations of offsetting remedial items are 
made to a related partner.”  T.D. 9485, 2010-26 I.R.B. 771.  It should be noted that the abuse in these 
transactions did not involve shifting tax consequences in a way that was inconsistent with economic 
consequences, since the remedial method ensures consistency between the two.  Rather, because the partners 
were related parties, the partners were willing to shift economic consequences in order to shift tax 
consequences and obtain a favorable tax result.  Unrelated parties would not ordinarily be willing to engage 
in such a transaction.  For discussion of the Enron transaction, see the discussion of “Project Condor” in 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX‟N, 107TH CONG., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND 
RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
(Joint Comm. Print 2003).   
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1).     
57 This is also suggested by the language of the anti-abuse rule itself, since the Treasury Regulation 
states that it applies when the contribution of the property “and” the allocation of tax items are made with a 
view to shifting tax consequences.  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10).  In addition, the Treasury Regulations 
provide examples in which the use of a particular method is unreasonable because the contribution of the 
property in the first place is made with a view to shifting tax consequences.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(2), 
Example 2 (2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c)(4), Example 3 (2010).   
58 For further discussion, see Joel Scharfstein, An Analysis of the Section 704(c) Regulations, 48 
TAX LAW. 71, 88 (1994) (“Although the regulations do not indicate what „with a view‟ means, it must mean 
something less than „the principal purpose.‟  Is a „principal purpose‟ or a „significant purpose‟ required, or 
will the proscribed view be considered to exist whenever there are tax advantages (or the possibility of tax 
advantages), and the partners knew about them?”). 





determining whether or not the contribution of the property and allocation method(s) used 
substantially reduce the present value of the partners‟ aggregate tax liability.59  One might 
think that the tax consequences that would result from using the remedial method should 
be used as a baseline since the remedial method is intended to ensure that tax 
consequences of built-in gain or built-in loss are not shifted among the partners.  
However, the preamble to the Treasury Regulations indicates otherwise, stating, “[T]he 
IRS and Treasury believe that it would be inappropriate to adopt the remedial allocation 
method as a baseline for measuring whether the partners' aggregate tax liability has been 
reduced.  Such a baseline would make the remedial allocation method preeminent, 
undercutting its elective nature.”60  Moreover, the Treasury Regulations make explicit 
that, if a partnership is found to violate the anti-abuse rule, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“the Service”) may not cure the abuse by requiring that the partnership use the remedial 
method.
61
   
F. Other Constraints 
The Code contains other provisions designed to foreclose the ability of potential 
transactions to circumvent the purpose of § 704(c).  For example, §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 
737 prevent partnerships from avoiding the consequences that follow from § 704(c) by 
distributing property to a different partner than the partner who contributed the property
62
 
or by liquidating a contributing partner‟s interest prior to sale by the partnership of the 
contributed property.
63
  Also, § 704(c)(1)(C) provides that a partnership cannot allocate 
                                                             
59 For further discussion, see Id. at 87; Laura Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section 704(c), 3 FLA. 
TAX REV. 93, 116–17 (1996). 
60 T.D. 8585, 1995-1 C.B. 120. 
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(5)(ii) (2010). 
62 To illustrate the operation of § 704(c)(1)(B), assume, for example, A owns a piece of land that A 
acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The land is currently worth $15,000.  A contributes the land, B 
contributes $15,000 cash, and C contributes $15,000 cash to the newly formed ABC partnership, each in 
exchange for a one-third interest in the ABC partnership.  A does not recognize any gain as a result of the 
contribution.  I.R.C. § 721(a) (2010).  The ABC partnership‟s basis in the land is $5,000.  I.R.C. § 723 
(2010).  A‟s initial basis in his or her interest in the partnership is $5,000, B‟s initial basis in his or her 
interest in the partnership is $15,000, and C‟s initial basis in his or her interest in the partnership is $15,000.  
I.R.C. § 722 (2010).  If the partnership sold the land for $15,000, the partnership would recognize $10,000 of 
tax gain which would be allocated, in its entirety, to A regardless of which method the partnership uses for 
making § 704(c) allocations.  Instead of selling the land, assume the partnership distributes the land to B in 
liquidation of B‟s interest in the partnership, and, in a subsequent year, distributes $15,000 cash to each of A 
and B in liquidation of the partnership.  Absent a special rule (and assuming § 751(b) does not apply and 
assuming that the land is not inventory), no gain or loss would be recognized by the ABC partnership, A, B, 
or C as a result of the distribution.  I.R.C. §§ 731(a), 731(b) (2010).  B‟s basis in the land would equal 
$15,000 (B‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership prior to liquidation).  I.R.C. § 732(b) (2010).  A 
recognizes $10,000 of gain upon receipt of $15,000 cash on liquidation of the partnership.  Therefore, A 
eventually recognizes an amount of gain equal to the built-in gain that existed when the property was 
contributed to the partnership.  However, the gain is not recognized until liquidation.  If the land is distributed 
to B within 7 years of A‟s contribution of the land to the partnership, however, § 704(c)(1)(B) requires that A 
recognize $10,000 of gain from a deemed sale of the land at the time at which the land is distributed to B. 
63 To illustrate the operation of § 737, assume, for example, A owns a piece of land (Land #1) that 
A acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The land is currently worth $15,000.  A contributes Land #1, B 
contributes $15,000 cash, and C contributes $15,000 cash to the newly formed ABC partnership, each in 
exchange for a one-third interest in the ABC partnership.  A does not recognize any gain as a result of the 
contribution.  I.R.C. § 721(a).  The ABC partnership‟s basis in Land #1 is $5,000.  I.R.C. § 723.  A‟s initial 
basis in his or her interest in the partnership is $5,000, B‟s initial basis in his or her interest in the partnership 
is $15,000, and C‟s initial basis in his or her interest in the partnership is $15,000.  I.R.C. § 722.  The ABC 
partnership acquires an additional parcel of land (“Land #2”) for $15,000.  If the partnership sold Land #1 




any portion of a pre-contribution loss with respect to property contributed to a partnership 
to a partner other than the contributing partner.
64
  Thus, § 704(c)(1)(C) limits the shifting 
of tax losses from the contributing partner to other partners even though § 704(c) is 
evidently less concerned about shifting tax gains from one partner to another partner 
despite the fact that shifting tax gains can also reduce tax revenue (as shown in Tables 7 
and 8 below).  This asymmetrical treatment of tax gains and losses is replicated in other 
areas of tax law.
65
      
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(the land contributed by A) for $15,000, the partnership would recognize $10,000 of tax gain which would be 
allocated, in its entirety, to A regardless of which method the partnership uses for making § 704(c) 
allocations.  Assume, rather than selling Land #1, at a time when the value of each parcel of land is still 
$15,000, the partnership distributes Land #2 to A in liquidation of A‟s interest in the partnership.  Absent a 
special rule (and assuming § 751(b) does not apply), no gain or loss would be recognized by the ABC 
partnership, A, B, or C as a result of the distribution.  I.R.C. §§ 731(a), 731(b).  A‟s basis in Land #2 would 
equal $5,000 (A‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership prior to liquidation).  I.R.C. § 732(b).  
Therefore, upon a sale of Land #2 for $15,000, A would recognize an amount of gain equal to the built-in 
gain that existed when Land #1 was contributed by A to the partnership.  I.R.C. § 737 alters the results just 
described.  If the distribution to A occurs within 7 years of A‟s contribution of Land #1 to the partnership, 
§ 737 requires that A recognize $10,000 of gain from a deemed sale of Land #1 at the time at which the 
distribution is made to A, and, as a result of the application of § 737, A would obtain a $15,000 basis Land 
#2. 
64 It is unclear how this restriction should be reconciled with the statement in the Treasury 
Regulations that the Service will not require a partnership to use the remedial method.  See Treas. Reg. § 
1.704-3(d)(5)(ii).  It appears that, in the case of property contributed with a built-in loss, § 704(c)(1)(C) leads 
to the same result as the remedial method for all partners other than the partner who contributed the property 
by providing that, with respect to such partners, the property will be treated as if its tax basis equals its fair 
market value at the time of the contribution.  See I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C)(ii) (2010).  However, it may be the 
case that, with respect to the contributing partner, the results are not required to match the results that would 
follow from the remedial method.  For example, assume two individuals, A and B, form a partnership.  A 
contributes land with a basis of $200 and a fair market value of $150 to the partnership in exchange for a 
50% interest in the partnership.  B contributes $150 cash to the partnership in exchange for a 50% interest in 
the partnership.  The partnership subsequently sells the land for $200.  As a result of § 704(c)(1)(C), the 
partnership will be treated as if its tax basis in the land is $150 for purposes of determining tax gain or loss 
allocated to B.  Consequently, B will be allocated $25 of tax gain as a result of the sale.  The same result 
would follow absent § 704(c)(1)(C) if the partnership used the remedial method.  In particular, while the 
partnership would not recognize any actual tax gain or loss (since its basis in the land is $200), the 
partnership would invent a notional item of $25 of tax gain to allocate to B to match the $25 of economic 
gain realized by B.  Section 704(c)(1)(C) has no effect on the basis of the land for purposes of determining 
tax gain or loss allocated to A, the non-contributing partner.  Therefore, with respect to A, it seems that, if the 
partnership uses the traditional method, A would be allocated no tax gain or loss (since the partnership 
recognizes no tax gain or loss).  However, if the partnership uses the remedial method, it seems A would be 
allocated $25 of tax loss (which consists of $25 tax loss invented to offset the $25 tax gain that is invented to 
allocate to B). 
65 For example, in the case of inter vivos gifts, as a result of the basis rules in § 1015(a), the tax 
consequences of existing built-in gain can be shifted from the donor to the donee but the tax consequences of 
existing built-in loss cannot be shifted (for purposes of recognizing a loss).  Along similar lines, when a 
shareholder contributes property to a corporation in a transaction that does not lead to recognition of gain or 
loss as a result of § 351, if the property has a built-in gain, the built-in gain will be preserved at two levels (at 
the shareholder level, by giving the shareholder a basis in stock received that is less than the fair market value 
of the stock and, at the corporate level, by giving the corporation a basis in the property contributed that is 
less than the fair market value of the property).  I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 362(a) (2010).  However, if property 
contributed by a shareholder has, in aggregate, a built-in loss, the built-in loss will be preserved either at the 
shareholder level (by giving the shareholder a basis in stock received that is greater than the fair market value 
of the stock) or at the corporate level (by giving the corporation a basis in the property contributed that is 
greater than the fair market value of the property) but not at both levels.  I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 362(e)(2) 
(2010). 





G. Reverse § 704(c) Allocations 
If a new partner joins a partnership at a time when the partnership‟s existing 
assets contain built-in gains or built-in losses and the partnership revalues its assets to 
reflect the fact that the new partner buys into the partnership based on the current value of 
the partnership‟s assets, allocation methods similar to the allocation methods described 
above must be used to prevent shifting the tax consequences of built-in gains and built-in 
losses from the existing partners to the new partner.
66
  In this context, the tax allocations 
are sometimes called “reverse § 704(c)” allocations. 
To illustrate the operation of reverse § 704(c) allocations, assume the following 
set of facts: 
Example 2.  Two individuals, A and B, form an 
entity treated as a partnership for tax purposes.  A and B 
each contribute $5,000 cash to the newly formed AB 
partnership.  The AB partnership acquires a parcel of 
land for $10,000.  The AB partnership‟s basis in the land 
is $10,000.  At a time when the value of the land is 
$30,000, another individual, C, contributes $30,000 cash 
to the AB partnership in order to acquire a 50% interest 
in the partnership.  The partnership revalues the land to 
$30,000 to reflect the partners‟ economic arrangement.   
 
If the partnership subsequently sells the land for $30,000, the partnership will 
recognize a $20,000 tax gain.  Regardless of which method the partnership uses for 
making reverse § 704(c) allocations with respect to the land, the partnership will allocate 
this tax gain to A and B (not C) in its entirety.  Thus, the tax consequences of the existing 
built-in gain are not shifted to C.  This result appropriately matches the partners‟ 
economic arrangement because the economic benefit of the $20,000 increase in value of 
the land is captured by A and B and not C.  In other words, if the partnership distributes 
the $60,000 cash it holds after sale of the land 50% to A and B and 50% to C, A and B 
collectively receive $20,000 more than they initially contributed to the partnership and C 
receives only a return of C‟s initial contribution.  Thus, it is appropriate that A and B, 
collectively, are allocated $20,000 of tax gain, while C is allocated no tax gain or loss. 
H. Special Rules for Securities Partnerships 
In general, § 704(c) allocations and reverse § 704(c) allocations must be 
determined on a property-by-property basis.
67
  This requirement is relaxed in the case of 
reverse § 704(c) allocations made by a “securities partnership,” which is allowed to 
determine reverse § 704(c) allocations on an aggregate basis across all of its “qualified 
financial assets.”68  A “securities partnership” is a partnership that shares all economic 
gain pro rata among partners based on capital invested (except for a disproportionate 
share that benefits a partner who provides investment management services) and is either 
(1) registered as a management company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or 
(2) holds qualified financial assets that represent at least 90% of the value of its non-cash 
                                                             
66 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i) (2010). 
67 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(2) (2010). 
68 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3) (2010). 




assets and revalues its assets at least annually.
69
  A “qualified financial asset” is personal 
property (including stock) that is actively traded and, in some cases, certain other 
property.
70
  A typical hedge fund, for example, would qualify as a “securities 
partnership.”  The distinction between an asset-by-asset approach and an aggregate 
approach is demonstrated by the following example. 
1.   Facts of Example 3 
The AB partnership qualifies as a securities partnership.  The AB partnership 
owns two assets, both of which are qualified financial assets.  Two individuals, A and B, 
formed the AB partnership by contributing $100 each to the partnership in exchange for a 
50% interest.  A third individual, C, subsequently acquires a 50% interest in the 
partnership (diluting A‟s interest to 25% and B‟s interest to 25%).  The assets held by the 
partnership at the time C joins the partnership, along with the original cost of each asset, 
the value of each asset at the time C joins the partnership, the eventual sale price of each 
asset, and the timing of the subsequent sale of each asset are shown in the table below. 










Stock 1 $100 $150 $200 Year 1 
Stock 2 $100 $125 $110 Year 1 
Cash (contributed 
by C) 
N/A $275 N/A N/A 
 
2.   Results Under an Asset-by-Asset Approach 
Upon sale of Stock 1 for $200, the partnership recognizes $100 of taxable gain.  
Because $50 of built-in gain existed with respect to Stock 1 at the time C joined the 
partnership, the partnership must allocate $50 of the tax gain equally to A and B.  The 
remaining $50 tax gain is attributable to gain that accrued after C joined the partnership 
and, therefore, is allocated 25% to A, 25% to B, and 50% to C, which corresponds to how 
they share in the $50 of gain economically. 
Upon sale of Stock 2 for $110, the partnership recognizes $10 of taxable gain.  
Twenty five dollars of built-in gain existed with respect to Stock 2 at the time C joined 
the partnership and $15 of economic loss accrued with respect to Stock 2 after C joined 
the partnership.  Tax allocations made upon sale of Stock 2 will depend on which method 
the partnership uses for making reverse § 704(c) allocations with respect to Stock 2.  If 
the partnership uses the traditional method, for example, the partnership will allocate $10 
of taxable gain equally to A and B and none to C.  If the partnership uses the remedial 
method, though, the partnership will allocate a notional item of 50% times $15 (or $7.50) 
of tax loss to C (to correspond to the economic loss realized by C) and a notional item of 
                                                             
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(iii) (2010). 
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3)(ii)(A), (B) (2010). 





$7.50 of tax gain plus $10 of actual tax gain (or $17.50 of tax gain) equally to A and B 
(which corresponds to the net economic gain realized by A and B). 
3.   Results Under an Aggregate Approach 
Rather than tracking existing built-in gain asset-by-asset, the partnership simply 
takes into account the fact that an aggregate built-in gain existed when C joined the 
partnership.  Furthermore, upon sale of a given asset, the partnership need not consider 
the amount of built-in gain that existed with respect to that particular asset when C joined 
the partnership.  These facets of the aggregate approach can simplify the calculations 
involved, particularly if the partnership holds hundreds of qualified financial assets.   
If an aggregate approach is used in the example above, the partnership will 
maintain a revaluation account for each partner reflecting the amount of tax gain that 
should be allocated to that partner.  For each of A and B, at the end of year 1, the balance 
of the revaluation account will be 50% times $75 (their share of built-in gain that exists 
when C joins, calculated as $150 value Stock 1 when C joins minus $100 acquisition cost 
Stock 1 plus $125 value Stock 2 when C joins minus $100 acquisition cost Stock 2) plus 
25% times $35 (their share of net gain that accrues after C joins, calculated as $200 
eventual sale price Stock 1 minus $150 value Stock 1 when C joins plus $110 eventual 
sale price Stock 2 minus $125 value Stock 2 when C joins) or $46.25 in total.  For C, at 
the end of year 1, the balance of the revaluation account will be 50% times $35 (C‟s share 
of net gain that accrues after C joins) or $17.50.  Upon sale of Stock 1 for $200, the 
partnership recognizes $100 of taxable gain.  This $100 taxable gain will be allocated pro 
rata to A, B, and C based on the balance of each partner‟s revaluation account or $42 to 
A, $42 to B, and $15.90 to C.  Upon sale of Stock 2 for $110, the partnership recognizes 
$10 of tax gain.  This $10 taxable gain will be allocated pro rata to A, B, and C based on 
the balance of each partner‟s revaluation account or $4.25 to A, $4.25 to B, and $1.60 to 
C. 
As a result, total allocations of tax gain to each partner from both assets are: (1) 
$46.25 for A, (2) $46.25 for B, and (3) $17.50 for C.  For A and B this corresponds to 
their 50% share of the $75 of built-in gain that existed at the time C joined plus their 25% 
share of the additional $35 of net gain that accrued after C joined.  For C, this 
corresponds to 50% of the $35 of net gain that accrued after C joined the partnership. 
II. HISTORY OF § 704(c) AND CONCERNS ABOUT UNSOPHISTICATED 
PARTNERS 
Section 704(c) did not always exist in the form described above.  In fact, when 
the part of the Code governing the taxation of partners and partnerships was adopted in 
1954, applying the principles described above was entirely optional.  This part will 
describe the original version of § 704(c), justifications offered for the original version of 
§ 704(c), and the evolution of § 704(c) from its original form to its current form.  As this 
discussion will show, concerns about imposing complex rules on unsophisticated partners 
played a key role in the development of § 704(c). 
A. Original Version of § 704(c) 
As originally enacted, § 704(c) provided that tax items recognized by a 
partnership with respect to property contributed to the partnership would be allocated “in 




the same manner as if such property had been purchased by the partnership.”71  This 
general rule applied unless the partnership elected to make allocations in a manner that 
took into account the difference between the property‟s fair market value and its basis at 
the time of the contribution.
72
   
In order to illustrate the operation of the original rule, assume the following set of 
facts: 
Example 4.  A owns a piece of land that A 
acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The land is 
currently worth $15,000.  A contributes the land and B 
contributes $15,000 cash to the newly formed AB 
partnership, each in exchange for a 50% interest in the 
AB partnership.  A does not recognize any gain as a 
result of the contribution.  The AB partnership‟s basis in 
the land is $5,000.  A‟s initial basis in his or her interest 
in the partnership is $5,000, and B‟s initial basis in his or 
her interest in the partnership is $15,000.  The 
partnership sells the land for $15,000.  As a result, the 
partnership recognizes $10,000 of tax gain from sale of 
the land.  
 
Based on the original version of § 704(c), the partnership had two choices.  
Under the general rule, the partnership would allocate the $10,000 of tax gain as if the 
land had been purchased by the partnership.  In other words, the partnership would 
allocate the tax gain equally ($5,000 each) to A and B since A and B each own a 50% 
interest in the partnership.
73
  This would shift $5,000 of tax gain from A to B since, 
economically, A has realized a $10,000 economic gain (attributable to precontribution 
appreciation) and B has realized no economic gain.  Following the allocation of tax gain 
of $5,000 to each partner, A‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership would be 
$10,000, and B‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership would be $20,000.  If the 
partnership distributed $30,000 cash equally  to A and B on liquidation ($15,000 each), A 
would recognize $5,000 of tax gain on liquidation and B would recognize $5,000 of tax 
loss on liquidation.  But for character and timing differences (which could be significant), 
the tax gains and losses recognized on liquidation offset the earlier shift of tax gain from 
A to B.   
Alternatively, if it chose to do so, the partnership could apply the principles of 
current § 704(c) by allocating tax gain in a manner that takes into account the difference 
between the fair market value of the land and the basis of the land at the time of 
contribution.  In that case, all $10,000 of tax gain recognized on sale of the land would be 
allocated to A, so that no tax gain would be shifted from A to B. 
 
                                                             
71 I.R.C. § 704(c)(1) (1954). 
72 I.R.C. § 704(c)(2) (1954). 
73 If the partnership, in fact, planned to use this method, B would likely be willing to contribute less 
than $15,000 if B were taxable on gain from sale of the land.  For simplicity, the example above assumes that 
B is not taxable on gain from sale of the land. 





B. Justifications Offered for the Original Version of § 704(c) 
When discussing why it adopted the original version of § 704(c), the Senate 
Finance Committee stated that the general rule (under which partnerships did not take 
into account built-in gains and losses) was adopted because “of its extreme simplicity” 
compared to alternative methods.
74
  The general rule was viewed as simple because tax 
items recognized with respect to contributed property could be allocated in the same 
manner as all other tax items.
75
  The Committee‟s concerns about complexity likely arose 
because of its observation that many partnerships were unsophisticated.  As an indication 
of this underlying rationale, the Senate Finance Committee lamented that uncertainty in 
partnership tax was “particularly unfortunate” given the large number of partnerships and 
given that “the partnership form is much more commonly employed by small businesses 
and in farming operations than the corporate form.”76 
Finally, the Committee seemed to assume that partners in a partnership would 
generally be subject to similar effective rates of tax so that shifting tax consequences 
from one partner to another partner should not raise serious concerns.  Therefore, the 
Committee was not overly worried about whether or not partnerships employed a method 
that took into account built-in gains and losses, and, consequently, provided partnerships 
with the flexibility to decide whether to use such a method.  Thus, the Committee stated, 
“partners should be free to choose this more complicated rule for dividing basis of 
property [in other words, the method that takes into account built-in gains and built-in 
losses] if they desire the more accurate tax results it brings.”77  However, use of the more 
accurate method was elective because, in the Committee‟s view, whether a partnership 
used the more complicated and accurate method was “not a matter involving revenue 
considerations to the Government.”78 
C. Evolution of § 704(c) 
Over time it became clear that shifting tax consequences from one partner to 
another was, in fact, a “matter involving revenue considerations to the Government.”79  
When partners have significantly different tax profiles, shifting tax consequences among 
partners can reduce total tax revenue collected, at least if the time value of money is 
taken into account and, in some cases, even if it is not. 
In order to illustrate, we return to the facts of Example 4 given above and add 
some additional facts about the partners.  In particular, assume that B is subject to a 0% 
effective rate of tax on tax gain from sale of the land and on tax gain and loss from 
liquidation of B‟s interest in the partnership.  Perhaps B is a tax-exempt entity and does 
not take into account tax gain or loss from sale of the land or liquidation of B‟s interest in 
the partnership for purposes of computing any tax liability B might owe.  Alternatively, 
perhaps B has significant tax losses from other sources that would offset tax gain from 
sale of the land and make tax loss from liquidation of B‟s interest in the partnership not 
particularly valuable.  Assume A, on the other hand, would be subject to a 35% effective 
                                                             
74 S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 90 (1954). 
75 Id. at 90 (discussing the fact that the sharing of tax items with respect to contributed property is 
identical to the sharing of tax items with respect to non-contributed property under the general rule). 
76 Id. at 89.  For current statistics regarding size of partnerships, see supra notes 4, 5. 
77 Id. at 93. 
78 Id. 
79 For further discussion of the evolution of § 704(c), see, e.g., Gergen, supra note 9, at 348. 




tax rate on gain from sale of the land but a 15% effective tax rate on gain from liquidation 
of A‟s interest in the partnership.  Under this set of facts, the tax revenue collected using 
the general rule (under which tax gain from sale of the land is allocated equally to each 
partner) is shown in the following table. 
Table 3: General Rule (Tax Gain From Sale of Land Allocated Equally to A and B) 
 
Year Year 1 





Years 1 and 5 
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by A 
$5,000 gain $5,000 gain  
Tax Collected from A $1,750 $750  
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by B 
$5,000 gain $5,000 loss  
Tax Collected from B $0 $0  
Total Tax Collected $1,750 $750 $2,500 
 
By contrast, the tax revenue collected using the rule that applies current § 704(c) 
principles (under which tax gain from sale of the land is allocated entirely to A) is shown 
in the following table. 
Table 4: Built-In Gain Taken Into Account (Tax Gain From Sale of Land Allocated 
Entirely to A) 
 
Year Year 1 





Years 1 and 5 
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by A 
$10,000 gain $0  
Tax Collected from A $3,500 $0  
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by B 
$0 $0  
Tax Collected from B $0 $0  
Total Tax Collected $3,500 $0 $3,500 
   
Thus, under the facts assumed above, the method used would affect timing of tax 
revenue collection as well as the total dollar amount of tax revenue collected.  The facts 
of the example could be altered so that, for example, A is subject to a 15% effective tax 
rate on gain from sale of the land and a 15% effective tax rate on gain from liquidation of 
A‟s interest in the partnership, while B is subject to a 0% effective tax rate on gain or loss 





from sale of the land or liquidation of B‟s interest in the partnership.  Under this set of 
facts, the tax revenue collected using the general rule (under which tax gain from sale of 
the land is allocated equally to each partner) is shown in the following table. 
Table 5: General Rule (Tax Gain From Sale of Land Allocated Equally to A and B) 
 
Year Year 1 





Years 1 and 5 
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by A 
$5,000 gain $5,000 gain  
Tax Collected from A $750 $750  
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by B 
$5,000 gain $5,000 loss  
Tax Collected from B $0 $0  
Total Tax Collected $750 $750 $1,500 
 
By contrast, the tax revenue collected using the rule that applies current § 704(c) 
principles is shown in the following table. 
Table 6: Built-In Gain Taken Into Account (Tax Gain From Sale of Land Allocated 
Entirely to A) 
 
Year Year 1 





Years 1 and 5 
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by A 
$10,000 gain $0  
Tax Collected from A $1,500 $0  
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by B 
$0 $0  
Tax Collected from B $0 $0  
Total Tax Collected $1,500 $0 $1,500 
 
Thus, under this second set of facts, the same amount of total tax revenue is 
collected over the life of the partnership ($1500 in total) under either method.  However, 
if the partnership is required to apply current § 704(c) principles, more tax revenue is 
collected in an earlier year.  Assuming a 10% discount rate (compounded annually) for 
purposes of illustration, $750 of tax revenue collected in year 5 plus $750 of tax revenue 
collected in year 1 is the equivalent of $1262 of tax revenue collected in year 1.  




Therefore, if the partnership is required to apply current § 704(c) principles, the value of 
additional tax revenue collected in year 1 is $1500 minus $1262 or $238. 
Because a shift in tax consequences among partners can affect the amount of tax 
revenue collected and the timing of tax revenue collection, in 1984, § 704(c) was 
amended to largely resemble its current form.  Thus, allocating tax items so as to take 
into account built-in gain or built-in loss that existed when property was contributed to a 
partnership was no longer optional.  However, the Treasury Regulations that implement 
the current rules allow partnerships to select among various methods for making § 704(c) 
allocations subject to an anti-abuse rule, as described above.  Moreover, as described 
above, despite the fact that § 704(c) now requires a partnership to take into account built-
in gain or built-in loss when making allocations with respect to contributed property, 
unless the partnership uses the remedial method, it is still possible for tax consequences 
attributable to pre-contribution changes in the value of assets to be shifted from the 
contributing partner to the other partners. 
The Treasury did not require partnerships to use the remedial method (or 
something similar), in part because the Treasury apparently believed it lacked authority to 
do so.
80
  However, even if the Treasury was correct in this belief, mandatory use of the 
remedial method could have been required by Congress.  Aside from the possible 
limitations on the authority of the Treasury, resistance to mandatory use of the remedial 
method was driven by the same type of concerns that drove Congress to adopt the 
original version of § 704(c).  Namely, concerns about avoiding complexity impeded the 
adoption of a mandatory remedial method. 
One method under consideration leading up to the promulgation of final 
regulations under § 704(c) was called the “deferred sales method.”  The “deferred sales 
method” was similar to the remedial method and, like the remedial method, it would have 
ensured that tax consequences attributable to pre-contribution changes in asset value were 
not shifted away from the contributing partner.  In its March 1979 report, the American 
Law Institute (“A.L.I.”) did not recommend adopting the deferred sales method as a 
mandatory method under § 704(c) because of concerns about the method‟s complexity, 
even though the A.L.I. acknowledged that many partnerships in 1979 were sufficiently 
sophisticated to handle the complexities of the deferred sales approach.
81
  The A.L.I. was 
concerned about two aspects of complexity.  First, the A.L.I. was concerned that applying 
the method would require partnerships to value property at the time it was contributed to 
a partnership which could be difficult for properties that lacked readily ascertainable 
values.
82
  Moreover, the A.L.I. indicated that a method like the traditional method could 
                                                             
80 For further discussion, see Cunningham, supra note 59, at 116 – 17. 
81 See AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K, PROPOSALS FOR 
CHANGES IN THE RULES FOR TAXATION OF PARTNERS 153-54 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1979) (“The concern with 
complexity [discussed in 1954] . . . has continuing relevance.  Nevertheless, it is recognized that many of the 
partnerships that use Subchapter K today are more sophisticated than the partnerships which existed in 1954 
and would therefore be better able to handle the complexities of a deferred sale approach.”).  Id. at 156 
(“[T]he valuation difficulties inherent in a deferred sale approach . . . together with the complexity which 
such an approach was viewed as adding to Subchapter K, result in the conclusion that the Project would not 
recommend such a rule.”). 
82 Id. at 146 (“The most important difficulty with the deferred sale approach is that it requires 
valuation of all property contributed to a partnership.”).  For discussion of why this concern should not 
preclude adoption of the remedial method (or something similar such as the deferred sales method), see infra 
notes 158 to 160 and accompanying text. 





avoid some of the difficulties of valuing a property when it was contributed to a 
partnership.
83




Because the § 704(c) regulations do not require use of the remedial method, tax 
consequences can still be shifted in a manner that affects timing (and, in some cases, the 
total dollar amount) of tax revenue collected.  To illustrate, assume the following facts: 
 
Example 5.  A owns a piece of land that A 
acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The land is 
currently worth $15,000.  A contributes the land and B 
contributes $15,000 cash to the newly formed AB 
partnership, each in exchange for a 50% interest in the 
AB partnership.  The partnership sells the land for 
$10,000 in year 1.  The partnership recognizes $5,000 of 
tax gain from sale of the land.  In year 5, the partnership 
distributes $25,000 cash equally ($12,500 each) to A and 
B in liquidation.  B is subject to a 0% effective rate of 
tax on tax gain from sale of the land and on tax gain and 
loss from liquidation of B‟s interest in the partnership.  
A, on the other hand, is subject to a 35% rate of tax on 
tax gain from sale of the land but a 15% rate of tax on 
tax gain from liquidation of A‟s interest in the 
partnership.   
 
Based on the facts of Example 5, the tables below show the tax revenue collected 
under the traditional method and under the remedial method.  As the tables below 
illustrate, selection of the traditional method would result in lower total tax revenue and a 
delay in collection of tax revenue compared to use of the remedial method.
85
 
                                                             
83 Id. at 155 (“[T]he ceiling limitation [effectively the traditional method] is to some extent 
inconsistent with the more correct theoretical result under the deferred sale approach [effectively the remedial 
method]. . . . Despite this illogical element, the ceiling limitation has one important advantage.  It restricts 
any allocation to readily ascertainable factors – the property‟s basis and its sales price. . . . For this reason, a 
credited value or deferred sale approach with a ceiling limitation [effectively the traditional method] may 
avoid some of the valuation difficulties that would result under a pure credited value approach [effectively 
the remedial method].”).  For discussion of why this is incorrect, see infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
84 Id. at 151 (“A deferred sale or credited value approach will probably be perceived as more 
complex than present law by most taxpayers since it will require more computations.”).  For further 
discussion of the impediments to adopting the deferred sales approach, see Andrea Monroe, Saving 
Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings, and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
1381 passim (2009).  For an alternative explanation of why taxpayers are allowed to elect among different 
methods under § 704(c), see Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in 
the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 60-61 (2010) (arguing that § 704(c) represents an 
area in which lawmakers allowed for an election because all of the methods are reasonable approaches for 
implementing Congress‟s policy goal but also stating, “Nevertheless, Congress could have, and possibly 
should have, simply selected a single method for handling precontribution gains and losses.”  Id. at 61.).  
85 Under a different set of facts, the remedial method could result in less tax revenue than the 
traditional method.  This would be the case if, for example, the facts were the same except that A was subject 
to a lower rate of tax than B.  However, in such a case, the parties would likely opt for the remedial method 
even under current law, so mandating use of the remedial method should not result in tax revenue loss.  
Moreover, because the remedial method results in tax consequences that more accurately reflect economic 





Table 7: Traditional Method 
 
Year Year 1 





Years 1 and 5 
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by A 
$5,000 gain $2,500 gain  
Tax Collected from A $1,750 $375  
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by B 
$0 $2,500 loss  
Tax Collected from B $0 $0  
Total Tax Collected $1,750 $375 $2,125 
 
 
Table 8: Remedial Method 
 
Year Year 1 





Years 1 and 5 
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by A 
$7,500 gain $0  
Tax Collected from A $2,625 $0  
Tax Gain or Loss 
Recognized by B 
$2,500 loss $0  
Tax Collected from B $0 $0  
Total Tax Collected $2,625 $0 $2,625 
 
III. EXISTING LAW UNDER § 754 
Section 754 is a provision that allows a partnership to make an election that will 
generally dictate whether or not the partnership will adjust its basis in its assets following 
a transfer of an interest in the partnership or following certain distributions made by the 
partnership.  This Part discusses the mechanics of § 754 in detail. 
When one partner sells his or her interest in a partnership to another person, 
unless a § 754 election is in effect, generally the sale will have no impact on the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
consequences, the remedial method still results in a more accurate measure of tax liability even in cases in 
which it results in a lower amount of tax liability. 





partnership‟s basis in its assets.86  As a result, if a § 754 election is not in effect, gain 
attributable to an increase in the value of a partnership‟s assets potentially will be 
recognized twice for tax purposes – first on sale of an interest in the partnership and 
second on sale by the partnership of its assets.  By making a § 754 election, the 
partnership effectively eliminates the second, duplicative tax gain.
87
  Special rules apply 
in the case of partnerships that hold assets that have declined in value.
88
  Finally, once a 
partnership files a § 754 election, the election generally will apply to all transfers that 
occur in the year with respect to which the election was filed or any subsequent year.
89
  
A. Section 754 Elections and Built-In Gain Assets 
The mechanics of a § 754 election in the context of a partnership that holds assets 
that have appreciated in value can be more fully demonstrated by an example.  For 
purposes of the example, assume the following facts: 
Example 6.  Two individuals, A and B, each 
contribute $100 in exchange for a 50% interest in a 
newly formed entity treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes.  As a result, each partner will have a basis in 
his or her interest in the partnership equal to $100.
90
  The 
partnership uses the cash contributed by the partners to 
acquire a parcel of land for $200, so that the 
partnership‟s initial tax basis in the land is $200.  Over 
time, the value of the land increases.  Two years after the 
formation of the partnership, when the value of the land 
is $300 and the partnership holds no other assets and 
owes no liabilities, A sells his or her interest in the 
partnership to C for $150.  As a result of the sale, A will 
recognize $50 of gain for tax purposes, which equals the 
excess of the amount received from C over A‟s basis in 
his or her interest in the partnership.
91
  C‟s initial basis in 
his or her interest in the partnership will be $150.
92
   
If the partnership does not have a § 754 election in effect, the transfer will have 
no impact on the partnership‟s basis in the land, and, thus, under the facts of Example 6, 
the partnership‟s basis in the land will remain $200.93  Assume, one year after the sale of 
A‟s interest in the partnership to C, the partnership sells the land for $300.  Because the 
partnership‟s basis in the land remained $200, the partnership recognizes $100 of tax gain 
on sale of the land which is allocated $50 to C and $50 to B.  The $50 of tax gain that is 
allocated to C is effectively a duplication of the tax gain recognized by A on sale of his or 
her interest in the partnership to C because both items of $50 tax gain are attributable to 
                                                             
86 I.R.C. § 743(a) (2010). 
87 I.R.C. § 743(b) (2010). 
88 See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. 
89 I.R.C. § 754 (2010).   
90 I.R.C. § 722 (2010). 
91 This gain will be capital gain assuming the partnership does not hold the land as inventory and 
holds no unrealized receivables.  I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (2010). 
92 I.R.C. § 742 (2010). 
93 I.R.C. § 743(a) (2010). 




A‟s share of the increase in value of the land that occurred prior to sale of the partnership 
interest by A to C.   
This duplication of tax gain may be temporary.  In particular, as a result of the 
allocation of $50 of tax gain to each partner, each partner‟s basis in his or her interest in 
the partnership will increase by $50 so that C‟s basis in his or her interest in the 
partnership becomes $200 and B‟s becomes $150.94  As a result, if the partnership 
distributes $150 cash to B and C in liquidation, C will recognize a $50 tax loss at the time 
of the liquidation (the excess of C‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership over the 
amount of cash received) and B will recognize no tax gain or loss.
95
  The tax loss 
recognized by C on liquidation is equal in amount to the earlier, duplicative tax gain 
recognized by C on sale of the land.  However, the tax loss recognized by C may not fully 
offset the effects of the $50 of tax gain recognized by C on sale of the land if the 
liquidation of the partnership occurs in a later year than the year in which the land was 
sold.  For one thing, if the $50 of tax loss does reduce C‟s tax liability, it does so in a later 
year than the year in which C may have incurred tax liability as a result of the sale of the 
land.  Therefore, taking into account the time value of money and the fact that applicable 
tax rates may have changed since the time at which the land is sold, the tax loss may not 
fully offset the consequences of the tax gain.  For another thing, the tax loss is likely a 
capital loss
96
 and, assuming C is an individual, may result in only a limited reduction of 
tax liability if C does not recognize capital gains in the year in which the partnership is 
liquidated or in a subsequent year.  This is so because capital losses of non-corporate 
taxpayers can generally only be used against capital gains and up to $3,000 of ordinary 
income,
97
 and excess capital losses of non-corporate taxpayers can generally only be 




By contrast, if the partnership has made a § 754 election, the transfer of the 
partnership interest from A to C will have an impact on the partnership‟s basis in the 
land.  In particular, under the facts of Example 6, the partnership will increase its basis in 
the land by $50, which is calculated based on the excess of C‟s basis in his or her interest 
in the partnership (the $150 paid by C for the interest) over C‟s share of the partnership‟s 
basis in its assets ($100 or 50% of the $200 basis in the land).
99
  However, this increase in 
basis will be taken into account solely for purposes of determining C‟s tax consequences 
and will not affect tax gain or loss allocated to B.
100
  Assume, one year after the sale of 
A‟s interest in the partnership to C, the partnership sells the land for $300.  Absent the 
$50 increase in basis of the land, the partnership‟s basis in the land would have been 
$200, so that the partnership would have recognized $100 of tax gain.  Fifty percent of 
this amount or $50 would be allocated to B, and, even taking into account the basis 
adjustment, $50 is in fact allocated to B because the basis adjustment affects C and not B.  
On the other hand, the $50 of tax gain that would have been allocated to C absent an 
                                                             
94 I.R.C. § 705(a) (2010). 
95 I.R.C. § 731(a) (2010). 
96 Id. (flush language) (stating that the tax loss recognized on liquidation will be treated as tax loss 
recognized by C from a sale of the partnership interest); I.R.C. § 741 (2010) (stating that, except as provided 
in § 751, tax loss recognized from the sale of a partnership interest will be treated as capital loss). 
97 I.R.C. § 1211 (2010). 
98 I.R.C. § 1212 (2010).  
99 I.R.C. § 743(b) (2010). 
100Id. 





upward basis adjustment of $50 is entirely eliminated by the $50 upward basis 
adjustment, so that no tax gain or loss is allocated to C.  Thus, unlike what occurs in the 
absence of a § 754 election, the $50 of tax gain attributable to A‟s share of the increase in 
the value of the land that occurred prior to A‟s sale of his or her partnership interest to C 
(and that was recognized by A on sale of his or her interest in the partnership to C) is not 
recognized a second time by C when the land is sold by the partnership.  After the 
partnership recognizes $50 of tax gain and allocates it to B, B‟s basis in his or her interest 
in the partnership becomes $150 and C‟s remains $150.  Thus, if the partnership 
distributes $150 of cash to each partner on liquidation, neither partner recognizes gain or 
loss as a result of the liquidation.
101
   













                                                             
101 I.R.C. § 731 (2010). 
102 A similar issue of potential duplication of built-in gain arises when property is distributed by a 
partnership to a partner.  As is true in the case of the transfer of interests in a partnership, the built-in gain 
will or will not be duplicated depending on whether the partnership has a § 754 election in effect.  For 
example, assume three individuals, A, B, and C each contribute $100 in exchange for a one-third interest in a 
newly formed entity treated as a partnership for tax purposes.  As a result, each partner will have a basis in 
his or her interest in the partnership equal to $100.  I.R.C. § 722 (2010).  Assume the partnership uses $100 of 
the amount contributed by the partners to acquire a parcel of land for $100, so that the partnership‟s basis in 
the land is $100.  The partnership holds the remaining $200 contributed by the partners in cash.  At a time 
when the value of the land is $400, the partnership distributes $200 cash to A in liquidation of A‟s interest in 
the partnership.  A recognizes $100 of gain as a result of the distribution (the excess of the amount of cash 
received over A‟s basis in his or her interest in the partnership).  I.R.C. § 731(a) (2010).  This $100 tax gain 
is attributable to A‟s one-third share of the $300 of economic gain that has accrued with respect to the land.  
In other words, because the land is worth $300 more than its initial acquisition cost, the amount distributed to 
A in liquidation of A‟s interest must exceed the amount A contributed by one-third of $300 or $100, and 
because A receives $100 more in cash than the amount A contributed, A recognizes $100 of tax gain as a 
result of the distribution.  If no § 754 election is in effect, the distribution has no impact on the partnership‟s 
basis in the land.  I.R.C. § 734(a) (2010).  As a result, if the partnership sells the land for $400 in a 
subsequent year, the partnership will recognize $300 of tax gain, allocated $150 to each of B and C, and $50 
of the amount allocated to each partner represents a duplication of the tax gain recognized by A when A 
received the cash distribution.  If a § 754 election is in effect, then the partnership will increase its basis in the 
land by $100 to $200.  I.R.C. § 734(b) (2010).  As a result, if the partnership sells the land for $400 in a 
subsequent year, the partnership will recognize $200 of tax gain, allocated $100 to each of B and C, and none 
of the tax gain recognized by A is duplicated.  




Table 9: Section 754 Election and Built-In Gain Assets 
 Section 754 Election Not 
Made 
Section 754 Election 
Made 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
A on Sale of Partnership Interest 
to C  
$50 gain $50 gain 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
C on Sale of Land by Partnership  
$50 gain $0 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
B on Sale of Land by Partnership 
$50 gain $50 gain 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
C on Liquidation 
$50 loss $0 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
B on Liquidation 
$0 $0 
  
B. Section 754 Elections and Built-In Loss Assets 
If a partnership‟s assets have a “substantial built-in loss” immediately after the 
transfer of an interest in the partnership, then the results that would follow from making a 
§ 754 election are mandatory regardless of whether the partnership has made such an 
election.
103
  In other words, in such a case, the partnership is required to take steps to 
avoid the recognition of the same tax loss a second time.  A “substantial built-in loss” 
exists if a partnership‟s total basis in its assets, in aggregate, exceeds the total value of the 
partnership‟s assets by more than $250,000.104  Certain large partnerships, for which 
making basis adjustments would be particularly difficult, are allowed to carry out the 
purpose of mandatory downward basis adjustments through alternative methods.
105
   
The following example demonstrates the results of a mandatory downward basis 
adjustment and the limits on when such an adjustment is required.  For purposes of the 
example, assume the following facts: 
                                                             
103 I.R.C. § 743(b) (2010).  
104 I.R.C. § 743(d)(1) (2010).  A similar rule applies in the case of downward basis adjustments in 
connection with the distribution of property.  I.R.C. §§ 734(b), (d).    
105 Making basis adjustments becomes computationally more difficult if a partnership holds 
multiple assets and if interests in the partnership change hands frequently.  This is the case since a separate 
basis adjustment has to be taken into account for each asset with respect to each transfer.  In recognition of 
this fact, § 743(e) of the Code provides that the mandatory downward basis adjustments that would otherwise 
apply in the case of a “substantial built-in loss” do not apply to an “electing investment partnership,” 
provided that the partnership establishes that losses are only allocated to the transferee partner to the extent 
they exceed the loss recognized by the transferor.  Several open questions remain regarding which entities 
can qualify as electing investment partnerships and regarding how partnerships can comply with the 
requirement of establishing that losses are only allocated to the transferee partner to the extent they exceed 
the loss recognized by the transferor.  For further discussion, see Kristen J. Hangen, Economic Crisis Renews 
Interest in Electing Investment Partnerships, 126 TAX NOTES 945 (2010).  Regarding the reason for adopting 
a special rule for electing investment partnerships, the House Committee Report stated, “The Committee was 
made aware that certain types of investment partnerships would incur administrative difficulties in making 
partnership-level basis adjustments.” H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 283 (2004).   





Example 7.  Two individuals, A and B, each 
contribute $500,000 in exchange for a 50% interest in a 
newly formed entity treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes.  The partnership uses the cash contributed by 
the partners to acquire a parcel of land for $1,000,000.  
Over time the value of the land decreases.  Two years 
after the formation of the partnership, when the value of 
the land is $700,000 and the partnership holds no other 
assets and owes no liabilities, A sells his or her interest 
in the partnership to C for $350,000.  One year later, the 
partnership sells the land for $700,000.  Two years after 
that, the partnership distributes $350,000 cash to each of 
B and C in liquidation.   
 
Because the partnership‟s basis in its assets exceeds the value of the partnership‟s 
assets by $300,000 immediately after the transfer under the facts of Example 7, a 
substantial built-in loss exists, and the partnership must reduce the basis in the land by 
$150,000 for purposes of determining C‟s tax consequences.  The resulting tax 
consequences are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 10: Substantial Built-In Loss 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized 
by A on Sale of Partnership 
Interest to C in Year 2 
$150,000 loss 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized 
by C on Sale of Land by 
Partnership in Year 3 
$0 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized 
by B on Sale of Land by 
Partnership in Year 3 
$150,000 loss 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized 
by C on Liquidation in Year 5 
$0 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized 
by B on Liquidation in Year 5 
$0 
 
By contrast, if the special rule regarding duplication of built-in losses did not 
apply and the partnership had not made a § 754 election under the facts of Example 7, the 








Table 11: Tax Consequences Absent Substantial Built-In Loss Rules and Absent 
§ 754 Election 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
A on Sale of Partnership Interest 
to C in Year 2 
$150,000 loss 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
C on Sale of Land by Partnership 
in Year 3 
$150,000 loss 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
B on Sale of Land by Partnership 
in Year 3 
$150,000 loss 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
C on Liquidation in Year 5 
$150,000 gain 
Tax Gain or Loss Recognized by 
B on Liquidation in Year 5 
$0 
  
In this case, the $150,000 tax loss recognized by A on sale of his or her interest 
in the partnership to C is duplicated, at least temporarily, because, upon sale of the land, 
C recognizes tax loss attributable to the same decrease in value of the land that led to A‟s 
tax loss.  The tax consequences of this tax loss recognized by C may be offset when C 
recognizes $150,000 tax gain on liquidation of the partnership.  However, the offset may 
not be perfect because the tax gain occurs in a later year than the year of the tax loss, and 
the tax gain could be of a different character, with different resulting tax consequences, 
than the tax loss.   
Finally, while mandatory downward basis adjustments prevent duplication of 
losses in cases like the example just described (as shown in Table 10), duplication of 
losses can, nevertheless, occur in some circumstances.  For example, in the case just 
presented, if the built-in loss that existed in the land at the time of the sale of the 
partnership interest from A to C had been $250,000 or less and a § 754 election was not 
in effect, then the built-in loss could be duplicated along the lines shown in Table 11.  A 
basis adjustment also would not be required if, for example, the partnership held land 
with a built-in loss of $300,000 at the time of the transfer but also held another asset with 
a built-in gain of $50,000 at the time of the transfer since the existence of a substantial 
built-in loss is determined on an aggregate basis across all assets.  Therefore, a 
partnership could duplicate a $300,000 loss if it also duplicated a $50,000 gain.  In the 
case of a partnership owned by individuals subject to high marginal rates of tax on 
ordinary income, for example, this could be a desirable outcome if the built-in gain asset 
was a capital asset (so that the gain that is duplicated is a capital gain subject to 
preferential tax rates) and the built-in loss asset is inventory (so that the loss that is 









C. Other Constraints 
In addition to the rules that apply in cases in which a partnership‟s assets have a 
“substantial built-in loss”, the anti-abuse regulations that apply for purposes of 
partnership tax law generally contain examples regarding potentially abusive transactions 
that involve the failure to make a § 754 election.
106
  The examples in the Treasury 
Regulations suggest that, if a partnership is formed largely for the purpose of duplicating 
a tax loss that results from the failure to make a § 754 election, the transaction can be 
successfully challenged.  However, the mere failure to make a § 754 election, in and of 
itself, will not be considered abusive simply because it results in the duplication of tax 
loss in a particular situation.  As the Treasury Regulations state, “The electivity of section 
754 is intended to provide administrative convenience for bona fide partnerships that are 
engaged in transactions for a substantial business purpose. . . . Congress clearly 
recognized that if the section 754 election were not made, basis distortions may result.”107 
IV. HISTORY OF § 754 AND CONCERNS ABOUT UNSOPHISTICATED 
PARTNERS 
As originally enacted, the results that follow from a § 754 election were not 
mandatory even in cases involving potential duplication of substantial built-in losses.  In 
2004, Congress enacted the rules mandating downward basis adjustments in cases in 
which a partnership‟s assets have a substantial built-in loss, in order to address concerns 
about tax-shelter transactions involving intentional duplication of losses.
108
   
Concerns about computational complexity have influenced the hesitation to 
require basis adjustments in all cases.
109
  For example, in a 1980 report recommending 
making basis adjustments mandatory in all cases, the A.L.I. acknowledged objections that 
could be made to such a change in the law.  One objection was that “unsophisticated 
partnerships might have to make complex basis adjustments.”110  The A.L.I. also 
expressed concern for partnerships at the other end of the spectrum, stating that large 
partnerships would face complexity if they had to make basis adjustments for 
“innumerable partners.”111   
                                                             
106 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example 8 (2010); c.f. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example 9 
(2010). 
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example 9 (2010). 
108 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 283 (2004) (“The Committee believes that the 
partnership rules currently allow for the inappropriate transfer of losses among partners.  This has allowed 
partnerships to be created and used to aid tax-shelter transactions.”); S REP. NO. 108-192, at 151 (2003) (“The 
Committee believes that the present-law electivity of partnership basis adjustments upon transfers and 
distributions leads to anomalous tax results, causes inaccurate income measurement, and gives rise to 
opportunities for tax sheltering.  In particular, the failure to make partnership basis adjustments permits 
partners to duplicate losses and to transfer losses among partners, creating an inappropriate incentive to use 
partnerships as tax shelter vehicles.”). 
109 For an alternative explanation for the § 754 election, see Field, supra note 84, at 35-36 (arguing 
that the purpose of allowing taxpayers to make the § 754 election is to reconcile the differences between tax 
consequences that result from a sale of an interest in a partnership and tax consequences that result from an 
economically similar sale by a partnership of an interest in its assets).  Yet, as Professor Field observes, this 
purpose could be served equally well if the results following from a § 754 election were mandatory.  Id. at 
42.  Professor Field also notes that mandatory adjustments may be undesirable because of complexity.  Id. at 
43. 
110 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 81-82 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1980).     
111 Id. 




Similarly, in 2004, the House Committee Report described the limitation of 
mandatory basis adjustments to cases involving substantial built-in losses as a feature that 
would preserve “the simplification aspects of the current partnership rules for 
transactions involving smaller amounts.”112  Interestingly, while the changes ultimately 
enacted principally resembled the House version of the bill, the Senate‟s original version 
of the bill would have required basis adjustments in all cases.  When discussing its 
proposed bill, the Senate Report stated: 
The electivity of these adjustments has become anachronistic and 
should be eliminated, the Committee believes.  Therefore, this provision 
makes these partnership basis adjustments mandatory, addressing both 
loss and gain situations.  The bill provides that the partnership basis 
adjustments remain elective in the limited case of transfers of a 
partnership interest by reason of the death of a partner because that 
situation may involve unsophisticated taxpayers and constitutes only a 




V. HOW REFORMS WOULD MAKE LAW LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO 
MANIPULATION BY SOPHISTICATED PARTNERSHIPS 
As discussed below, partnership tax law could be reformed in ways that would 
make the rules more suitable for sophisticated partnerships and unsophisticated 
partnerships at the same time.  The way to achieve this goal is adoption of rules that 
would require more accurate income measurement (such as requiring all partnerships to 
use the remedial method under § 704(c) and making the adjustments that follow from a 
§ 754 election mandatory in all cases).  These reforms would make the law more suitable 
for sophisticated partnerships because more accurate income measurement makes it more 
difficult for taxpayers to manipulate tax consequences.
114
  This Part elaborates on this 
conclusion as applied to §§ 704(c) and 754. 
A. Section 704(c) 
While the anti-abuse rule in the § 704(c) Regulations likely addresses the most 
flagrant cases of abuse,
115
 it leaves to partnerships the freedom to select a particular 
§ 704(c) method based purely on the goal of reducing tax liability.  Selecting the method 
that minimizes tax liability may not constitute abuse, but it may, nevertheless, be 
undesirable from the standpoint of tax revenue collection and fairness.  Unlike the anti-
abuse rule, a mandatory remedial method would bring to an end the ability of 
partnerships to select a particular method in order to reduce tax liability. 
                                                             
112 H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 283 (2004). 
113 S. REP. NO. 108-192, at 189-90 (2004). 
114 This is not intended as a broad claim that more accurate income measurement is always 
desirable or that taxable income should always match economic income as closely as possible.  The claim is 
limited to the context of §§ 704(c) and 754 where more accurate income measurement reduces potential for 
manipulation by sophisticated taxpayers, which is desirable from the standpoint of tax revenue collection and 
fairness.  For discussion of the impact of tax elections on fairness and tax revenue collection generally, see 
infra note 117.   
115 For a discussion of the potential impact of the anti-abuse rule on a fairly blatant case of abuse, 
see Karen C. Burke, Castle Harbour: Economic Substance and the Overall-Tax-Effect Test, 107 TAX NOTES 
1163 (2005).  For discussion of a simplified version of the facts of the Castle Harbour case, see supra note 
29. 





In order to illustrate, we can assume the following facts: 
Example 8. A owns a piece of land that A 
acquired some time ago for $5,000.  The land is 
currently worth $15,000.  A contributes the land and B 
contributes $15,000 cash to the newly formed AB 
partnership, each in exchange for a 50% interest in the 
AB partnership. B is subject to a 0% effective rate of tax 
on tax gain from sale of the land and on tax gain and loss 
from liquidation of B‟s interest in the partnership.  A, on 
the other hand, is subject to a 35% rate of tax on tax gain 
from sale of the land but a 15% rate of tax on tax gain 
from liquidation of A‟s interest in the partnership.   
 
Further, assume A and B formed the partnership and A contributed the land 
entirely for valid business reasons.  Regardless of the resulting tax consequences, A and 
B would have decided to form the partnership and have A contribute the land to the 
partnership.  Moreover, when the partnership was formed, the partners expected that the 
land would maintain its value or increase in value.  Therefore, they expected that the 
partnership would sell the land for at least $15,000.  If the land was sold for at least 
$15,000, the partnership would recognize at least $10,000 of tax gain on sale of the land, 
and, regardless of the method selected under § 704(c), the first $10,000 of tax gain would 
be allocated to A and any additional tax gain would be shared equally.  Thus, if the land 
was sold for at least $15,000, tax gain would be allocated in the same manner as 
economic gain and no shifting of tax consequences would result.  Therefore, the partners 
did not expect that the contribution of the land would result in a shift of tax gain from A 
(who is subject to a high effective rate of tax) to B (who is subject to a 0% rate of tax).
116
  
Consequently, since the land was contributed entirely for business reasons and since the 
partners did not expect the land to be sold at a price that would allow for a shift of tax 
consequences, the anti-abuse rule should not apply. 
That said, assume A and B seek advice regarding which § 704(c) method should 
be used with respect to the land.  Furthermore, assume that the land is in fact sold for less 
than $15,000, contrary to the partners‟ expectations.  Their advisors could recommend 
selecting the traditional method in order to shift tax gain from A (who is subject to a high 
rate of tax) to B (who is subject to a 0% rate of tax).  For example, if the land is sold for 
$10,000, the results under the traditional method versus the remedial method are shown 
in Tables 7 and 8 above.  Therefore, A and B select the traditional method.  They do so 
not because it is a computationally easier method to apply (even though that appears to be 
the reason that partnerships were given the flexibility to opt for methods other than the 
remedial method) but because it leads to more favorable tax consequences.   
                                                             
116 It is likely that taxpayers would rarely set up a transaction to shift tax consequences when the 
shift in tax consequences would only occur if an asset is sold for a sales price different than its current value.  
This may explain why the examples of abuse given in the Treasury Regulations are all examples where the 
expected shift in tax consequences results from the allocation of depreciation.  For discussion of these 
examples, see supra note 57.  See also Cunningham, supra note 59 at 117–18 (arguing that the examples in 
the Treasury Regulations suggest that the defining feature of cases involving abuse is designing a transaction 
to take advantage of significant differences between the remaining economic life of an asset and the 
remaining cost recovery period).   




In summary, while the anti-abuse rule may foreclose the most blatantly tax-
motivated transactions, the Treasury Regulations nevertheless give taxpayers the freedom 
to select among various allowable methods under § 704(c).  This election will generally 
be used by well-advised taxpayers to reduce potential tax liability.
117
  Moreover, in some 
cases, sophisticated partnerships will likely seek tax advice when designing transactions 
and may still use the flexibility afforded by § 704(c) to carry out tax-motivated 
transactions but do so with enough business purpose window dressing to escape the anti-
abuse rules.  Therefore, offering flexibility is undesirable from the standpoint of tax 
revenue collection and fairness, and, as discussed below, not well suited to the needs of 
unsophisticated partnerships.   
B. Section 754 
Existing rules mandating downward basis adjustments in some cases foreclose 
the possibility that losses will be duplicated in situations in which a particularly large 
built-in loss exists, in aggregate.  In addition, examples in the anti-abuse regulations may 
prevent the duplication of losses in cases not covered by the mandatory downward basis 
adjustment rules if the primary reason for forming a partnership is duplication of losses.  
Nevertheless, the failure to universally mandate basis adjustments may be undesirable 
from the standpoint of tax revenue collection and fairness.  The current rules leave open 
the possibility that losses can still be duplicated in a way that reduces tax revenue if valid 
business reasons exist for forming the partnership in the first place (or if taxpayers are 
able to disguise their tax-avoidance purpose with an engineered business purpose).  
Moreover, well-advised taxpayers will tend to benefit from the elective nature of the rules 
more often than other taxpayers.
118
  Therefore, particularly given the other concerns 
following from the elective nature of the rules described below, mandatory basis 
adjustments would be preferable to the existing system.   
VI. THE TRUTH ABOUT COMPLEXITY 
As discussed above, adoption of mandatory rules that would require more 
accurate income measurement would make partnership tax law less susceptible to 
manipulation by sophisticated partnerships.  Historically lawmakers have hesitated to 
enact these reforms on the grounds that they make the law too complex for 
unsophisticated partnerships.
119
  Fortunately, this is not the case, and, in fact, the opposite 
                                                             
117 Any time the tax law allows taxpayers to explicitly make an election that affects tax 
consequences, one concern is that the election will be used in a manner that only reduces tax revenue 
collected, particularly by well-advised, sophisticated taxpayers.  See, e.g., Field, supra note 84, at  26, 31 
(“The availability of tax planning opportunities is criticized as complex, costly, wasteful, revenue reducing, 
and inequitable, and these critiques may resonate particularly strongly in the context of explicit elections. . . . 
[A] well-advised rational taxpayer will almost always exercise the election in a way that minimizes its tax 
liability, at the expense of the fisc. . . . Additionally, an election, while technically available to all eligible 
taxpayers, may be functionally available only to the wealthiest, most sophisticated group of taxpayers, who 
can best navigate the complexity of the election process.”); George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business 
Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the “Check-the-Box” Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 
130 (1997) (“If the taxpayer is well-advised, the election, which has ramifications for tax purposes only, will 
always be to the detriment of the fisc.”). 
118 This concern arises in connection with tax elections generally.  See supra note 117 and 
accompanying text.  In addition, this concern was noted by the A.L.I.  When discussing the § 754 election, 
the A.L.I. stated, “The present elective system is often a trap for the unwary.”  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 80 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1980).   
119 See supra Parts II, IV. 





is true as these reforms would simplify the law in some respects and, in other respects, 
make the law no more complex.  The alternative conclusion (that the proposed reforms 
would make the law too complex) results from certain misconceptions about complexity.  
In the next Part, I will discuss those misconceptions, but, before doing so, in this Part, I 
will discuss how complexity should be understood, drawing, in part, from literature 
related to tax complexity and legal complexity generally.   
Legal complexity can be defined to include any features of law that cause costs to 
be incurred because time, effort, and expertise are required to understand and apply law.  
As a threshold matter, it is useful to differentiate between two types of complexity, which 
I will label “Ex Ante Complexity” and “Ex Post Complexity.”  Costs that follow from Ex 
Ante Complexity include: (1) the costs that result from steps taken by affected persons to 
ensure that the decisions they make concerning future activities are the same decisions 
that they would make if they fully understood the implications of relevant law; and (2) 
the costs that result because the decisions that affected persons make concerning future 
activities are not the same decisions that they would make if they fully understood the 
implications of relevant law.  Others have noted that rules that are not well understood 
are unlikely to create the incentives that they are intended to produce.
120
  The failure of 
misunderstood rules to create intended incentives is an example of the second type of cost 
just listed.  Costs that follow from Ex Post Complexity include costs of assessing 
consequences of actions already undertaken or complying with any requirements to 
report actions already undertaken.   
In the tax area, one key difference exists between Ex Ante Complexity and Ex 
Post Complexity.  With respect to Ex Ante Complexity, it may not be clear to 
unsophisticated taxpayers how altering their behavior could affect their tax liability.  
Therefore, unsophisticated taxpayers may not be likely to seek expert advice prior to 
undertaking activities.  With respect to Ex Post Complexity, it generally will be clear to 
taxpayers that it is necessary to file tax returns to report the results of activities already 
undertaken.  Thus, unsophisticated taxpayers are likely to be aware of the need to seek 
expert advice when preparing tax returns.   
Consequently, while there may be a material difference between unsophisticated 
partnerships and sophisticated partnerships with respect to Ex Ante Complexity (and 
therefore a reason to have particular concern for unsophisticated partnerships with respect 
to this type of complexity), there is less likely to be a material difference between 
unsophisticated partnerships (who seek expert advice) and sophisticated partnerships with 
                                                             
120 In other words, if people do not understand a rule, the rule is not likely to affect their behavior in 
the intended manner.  See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. 
J. TAX L. 91, 103 (2010) (making the argument in the tax context); Susan Dynarski & Judith Scott-Clayton, 
The Cost of Complexity in Federal Student Aid: Lessons from Optimal Tax Theory and Behavioral 
Economics 2, (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Fac. Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP06-013, 2006) 
(making the argument in the context of rules governing federal student aid); Austan Goolsbee, The TurboTax 
Revolution: Can Technology Solve Tax Complexity?, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 124, 138 (Henry 
J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (making the argument in the tax context).  In the tax area, scholars have 
argued that this effect may, at times, be a positive consequence of opaque rules.  Sometimes tax rules are 
intended to influence behavior, in which case it is crucial for the rules to be well understood.  Sometimes tax 
rules are intended to generate revenue with as little distortion of behavior as possible, in which case opaque 
rules might reduce distortions.  See, e.g., Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 passim (2009); 
Goolsbee, supra at 138; Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes 22-23 (N.Y.U. 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2010).   




respect to Ex Post Complexity.  Therefore, there is no reason why Ex Post Complexity 
would burden unsophisticated partnerships more severely than sophisticated 
partnerships.
121
  If anything, sophisticated partnerships may incur higher costs related to 
Ex Post Complexity because it may be more difficult to determine the tax consequences 
of complicated fact patterns typical of sophisticated partnerships.
122
  This part elaborates 
on the foregoing discussion by describing factors that contribute to each type of 
complexity or mitigate each type of complexity.
123
 
A. Ease With Which Otherwise Complex Rules Are Avoided as a 
Mitigating Factor 
The ease with which otherwise complex rules can be avoided can mitigate both 
Ex Ante Complexity and Ex Post Complexity.  In other words, a rule that raises thorny 
issues when it applies does not meaningfully contribute to complexity if simple steps can 
                                                             
121 Ex Post Complexity might represent a special concern for a particular type of partnership, 
namely a small partnership, since, given the relatively fixed nature of costs related to Ex Post Complexity, 
such costs could impose a larger relative burden on small partnerships.  However, small partnerships are not 
necessarily unsophisticated partnerships. 
122 In particular, while many people have remarked on the admitted complexity of partnership tax, 
some of the most technically difficult rules can be avoided by simple partnerships.  See, e.g., Philip F. 
Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54 TAX LAW. 451, 474 (2001) (stating that an 
A.L.I. report regarding taxation of private business that criticizes the complexity of partnership tax law 
“ignores the simplicity of Subchapter K in simple business arrangements” and citing to the fact that very 
simple partnerships can avoid analysis of technical rules specifying when allocations have “economic effect” 
if they comply with the “economic effect equivalence” test).  Sections 704(c) and 754 are additional 
examples of partnership tax rules that tend to become more computationally complex when applied to 
complicated partnerships.  Section 704(c) (or, more precisely, reverse § 704(c)) is most difficult to apply to a 
partnership, such as a hedge fund, that holds a large number of assets and that admits different partners over 
time who buy into the partnership based on the value of its assets at the time they join.  Relief for this 
complexity is granted by allowing securities partnerships to apply reverse § 704(c) on an aggregate basis.  
See supra notes 67 - 70 and accompanying text.  However, as a demonstration of their ability to cope with 
complexity, many securities partnerships use an asset-by-asset method even though they would be allowed to 
use the theoretically simpler aggregate method.  See Scharfstein, supra note 58, at 94 (“[A] substantial 
number of securities partnerships now use asset-by-asset tracking.  This is made feasible by the availability of 
computer programs designed for this purpose and the declining cost of computer usage.  In particular, asset-
by-asset tracking is rapidly becoming the norm among major securities partnerships with high minimum 
investments (e.g., $1 million or more).”).  Likewise, basis adjustments are the most difficult to apply to a 
partnership that holds a large number of assets and in which interests are transferred frequently.  The A.L.I. 
and Congress have recognized this fact.  See supra notes 105 and 111 and accompanying text. 
123 A number of factors contribute to complexity or mitigate complexity.  Factors of particular 
importance for the analysis in Part VII are discussed below.  It is possible to label factors that influence 
complexity differently or categorize concepts relevant to complexity under the heading of different factors.  
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L. J. 1 
passim (1992).  The factors listed in this paper are used as a helpful framework to demonstrate each of the 
ways in which the proposed reforms might affect complexity.  Using a different framework should not alter 
the ultimate conclusion that the proposed reforms would promote simplicity, in some respects, and at least 
not further complexity, in other respects.  For example, Professor Schuck lists four factors that contribute to 
legal complexity: (1) density (which exists when understanding the rules that apply in a given context 
requires the expertise of a wide variety of legal specialties), (2) technicality (which exists when 
understanding and applying rules requires special sophistication and expertise), (3) differentiation (which 
exists when applicable rules are provided by different sources that have different bases for legitimacy – such 
as statutes and common law), and (4) indeterminacy or uncertainty.  Id. at 3-4.  If the proposed reforms were 
analyzed under this framework, they would have no meaningful impact on factors (1) through (3), and they 
would reduce uncertainty.   





be taken to ensure that the rule does not apply.
124
  This principle is relevant generally as 
well as in tax.   
With regard to Ex Ante Complexity, if it were difficult to determine the effects of 
a rule on future activities but simple to adjust the future activities to ensure that a clearer 
rule applies, overall Ex Ante Complexity would be fairly low.  In tax, for example, under 
the Treasury Regulations that govern how entities are classified for tax purposes (the 
“Check-the-Box Regulations”), certain entities are eligible to elect whether they will be 
treated as pass-through entities or corporations for U.S. tax purposes.
125
  If an entity that 
is eligible to elect its classification does not file an election, it will be classified based on 
specified default rules.
126
  Unless a contrary election is filed, a U.S. domestic entity 
eligible to make an election is classified as a pass-through entity (i.e., a partnership or a 
disregarded entity) by default.
127
  For non-U.S. entities, the default rule is less 
straightforward.  A non-U.S. entity that is eligible to elect its classification is classified as 
a pass-through entity by default if at least one of its owners does not have limited liability 
but is classified as a corporation by default if all of its owners have limited liability.
128
  
Determining with certainty whether or not applicable non-U.S. law provides owners of a 
non-U.S. entity with “limited liability,” as the term is defined in the U.S. Treasury 
Regulations, is not an easy proposition.  At the very least, making such a determination 
would require consulting with and likely obtaining a costly opinion from non-U.S. legal 
counsel.  However, it is unnecessary to incur costs to determine an entity‟s default 
classification because taxpayers can, instead, take the easy step of filing an entity 
classification election specifying the desired classification.
129
  Thus, even when the 
parties are fairly confident that their intended classification is consistent with the default 
classification based on their understanding of whether or not the entity offers limited 
liability, they often file an entity classification election on a protective basis.
130
   
With regard to Ex Post Complexity, for example, if a given rule required onerous 
reporting requirements with respect to activities already undertaken but affected persons 
                                                             
124 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 25-27 (1995).  The 
example Professor Epstein provides is the rule against perpetuities.  Thoughtfully examining whether the rule 
would apply to any given fact pattern can be time consuming, and a person taking such an approach risks 
reaching the incorrect result at the end of his or her analysis.  However, a standard savings clause can be used 
as an expedient to ensure that the rule will not apply even if it would have applied absent inclusion of the 
savings clause.  Id.  As Professor Epstein observes, the same principles apply any time parties can easily 
contract around a default rule.  Id.  In particular, if contracting around a rule is easy, the rule is not complex 
as a practical matter even if it would take significant time and effort to understand the rule. 




129 This is not to say that the entity classification rules allow taxpayers to avoid the work of 
understanding the pass-through tax rules (or the corporate tax rules) because taxpayers can elect to treat an 
entity as a corporation (or as a pass-through entity).  In order to evaluate which classification is desirable, 
taxpayers need to understand the tax consequences of each classification.  However, once a taxpayer decides 
on the desired classification, the taxpayer can make a protective election in order to avoid the work of 
determining whether the entity would be treated as a corporation or a pass-through entity in the absence of 
making an election.  
130 A similar example involves filing a protective election to apply the qualified electing fund 
(“QEF”) rules to a non-U.S. corporation if it turns out to be classified as a passive foreign investment 
company (“PFIC”).  Such elections are frequently filed when it is difficult to determine whether or not the 
corporation could become a PFIC in the future.  See, e.g., William M. Funk, On and Over the Horizon: 
Emerging Issues in U.S. Taxation of Investments, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 1, 22 (2010).  




were allowed to take easy steps to avoid the reporting requirements even after the 
activities have been undertaken, overall Ex Post Complexity would be fairly low.   
B. Length and Technical Nature of Rules as Contributing Factors 
More technical rules increase Ex Ante Complexity and Ex Post Complexity, all 
else being equal.  Likewise, the length of potentially applicable law contributes to both 
types of complexity, all else being equal.  The length and technical nature of rules 
contribute to Ex Ante Complexity by making it more difficult to predict the effects of 
potential future actions.  Similarly, these factors contribute to Ex Post Complexity by 
making it more difficult to assess the effects of past actions.  
Other scholars have categorized rules as “technical” when understanding the 
rules requires special expertise.
131
  I use the term in a similar way.  Thus, rules tend to be 
more technical when they are described (in statutes, regulations, case law, or other 
applicable sources) using language that includes terms of art or words defined in 
particular, unique ways.  Furthermore, the computational difficulty of rules contributes to 
their technical nature. 
In tax, Ex Post Complexity related to computational difficulty can be 
significantly mitigated through use of computer programs.
132
  However, use of computer 
programs does not necessarily reduce the likelihood that computational difficulty will 
result in certain costs associated with Ex Ante Complexity.  In particular, 
computationally difficult rules could lead to an increased likelihood of incurring costs 
that result because the decisions that affected persons make regarding future actions are 
not the same decisions that they would make if they fully understood the implications of 
relevant law.
133
  Nevertheless, as discussed below in Part VI.A, computational difficulty 
does not invariably increase the likelihood of incurring such costs. 
C. Conformity to Expectations as a Mitigating Factor 
Conformity to expectations can mitigate Ex Ante Complexity.  In particular, even 
if a rule is long and technical, as long as the rule conforms to expectations, the rule does 
not significantly increase the likelihood of incurring costs that result because the 
decisions that affected persons make regarding future actions are not the same decisions 
that they would make if they fully understood the implications of the rule.  In other 
words, if a rule conforms to expectations, affected persons should make the same 
decisions that they would make if they fully understood the implications of the rule, even 
if the length and technical nature of the rule prevent affected persons from obtaining 
actual knowledge of the rule‟s specific terms.  
 In order to illustrate, we can make the assumption that a person who runs 
a business treated as a partnership for tax purposes has some cursory knowledge of 
partnership tax even though he or she lacks expertise.
134
  Assume that his or her cursory 
knowledge encompasses awareness of the fact that partnerships are not taxed at an entity 
                                                             
131 Schuck, supra note 123, at 3. 
132 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 120. 
133 Id. at 103 (arguing that computationally difficult rules turn the tax system into a black box, 
which is problematic for a number of reasons including the fact that it interferes with the “ability of taxpayers 
to engage in well-informed basic tax planning, and to respond appropriately to the many incentives Congress 
has embedded in the tax laws.”). 
134 This assumption is likely consistent with reality in many cases. 





level but instead allocate tax items to their partners.  However, assume that the person has 
no knowledge of the highly technical rules that specify how tax items are shared among 
partners.   
Under the facts assumed, it seems likely that the person would expect that tax 
items of a partnership would be shared among partners in a way that is consistent with 
how the partners share in economic gains and losses of the partnership,
135
 and the person 
should have a fairly solid understanding of how economic gains and losses are shared 
since that is a business matter.  The person‟s expectation about the sharing of tax items 
would work well as a rule of thumb since the consistency between tax and economics is 
the overall objective of the rules regarding allocation of tax items.  Thus, the person has a 
workable understanding of the results of the tax rules.   
Moreover, the person understands the results of the rules fairly well even though 
the Treasury Regulations regarding partnership tax allocations are long and technical.
136
  
Because of the length and technical nature of the Regulations, the precise parameters of 
the rules remain unknown to the business person who leaves the computational exercise 
of applying the rules (i.e. coping with Ex Post Complexity) to his or her tax accountants.  
Nevertheless, the person has an operational understanding of the rules since the result of 
the rules conforms to the person‟s expectations. 
As Professor Zelenak argues, computers cannot solve everything that is wrong 
with computationally difficult rules because, while computers handle the arithmetic 
associated with computational difficulty (and thus mitigate Ex Post Complexity), 
computers do not solve the potential problem of a lack of general understanding of 
technical rules (and thus have no effect on whether or not affected persons will take the 
rules into account when planning their activities).
137
  As an example of a computationally 
difficult rule, Professor Zelenak discusses the phase-out that reduces otherwise allowable 
itemized deductions by the lesser of: (1) 3% of the excess of adjusted gross income over 
$100,000; or (2) 80% of otherwise allowable itemized deductions.
138
   
I would note that the reason computers cannot address the resulting lack of 
understanding (which can distort decision-making) is that: (1) the rule is formulated in a 
way that is specific and arbitrary; and (2) the rule is technical.  Because it is formulated in 
a way that is specific and arbitrary, the rule cannot be consistent with the expectations of 
an uninformed person.  In other words, there is no reason why an uninformed person 
would have any intuitive estimate of the exact dollar amount at which a given phase-out 
sets in or the exact rate at which deductions are phased out because these parameters of 
the rule are inherently arbitrary.  Therefore, for a person to be assured of making the 
decisions he or she would make if he or she understood the rule, he or she would need to 
have knowledge of the exact specifications of the rule.  This knowledge is difficult to 
obtain since it requires wading through technical rules. 
 
                                                             
135 Such an expectation would be consistent with a general understanding that, subject to numerous 
exceptions, taxable income is intended to measure economic well being. 
136 The applicable Regulations under § 704(b) are approximately 70 pages long, and they use 
specialized terms of art like “capital account” and “substantiality.” 
137 Zelenak, supra note 120. 
138 Id. at 106 (citing § 68). 




D. Uncertainty as a Contributing Factor 
Uncertainty contributes to Ex Ante Complexity and Ex Post Complexity, all else 
being equal.  Uncertainty arises when a person who has a clear and correct understanding 
of all available legal authority still cannot confidently predict how the rules apply to a 
given set of facts.  
With respect to Ex Ante Complexity, a person affected by uncertain rules has 
three choices: (1) leave his or her intended future actions unchanged but strive to change 
applicable law in a way that reduces uncertainty, (2) leave his or her intended future 
actions and the law unchanged and accept a lack of understanding of the outcome of legal 
rules (and therefore accept the risk of incurring costs that follow from a failure to design 
future activities with the relevant legal rules in mind), or (3) leave applicable law 
unchanged but modify intended future actions so that the consequences of the actions are 
no longer uncertain.  Uncertainty contributes to Ex Ante Complexity because, under any 
of the three options just described, a person governed by uncertain law incurs costs. 
Under the first option, a person incurs costs in order to change applicable law.  In 
tax, such costs could include the expenses associated with obtaining a private letter ruling 
from the Service.  Under the second option, a person accepts the risk of incurring costs 
that follow from a failure to design future activities as if the person had the relevant legal 
rules in mind.  Under the third option, a person changes his or her actions so that the legal 
result of his or her actions becomes certain.  If the costs of changing a person‟s actions 
are low, this strategy involves easily avoiding an otherwise complex rule.  In tax, for 
example, as discussed above,
139
 a person could modify his or her actions by taking the 
inexpensive step of filing a protective entity classification election when the results that 
would follow from a failure to do so are uncertain.  However, this third strategy can be 
costly if the costs of modifying future activities are high.  In tax, for example, a taxpayer 
might face uncertainty regarding whether a given financial interest would be treated as 
debt or equity for tax purposes.  If the taxpayer wants more certainty regarding the tax 
outcome, he or she may have to modify the economic terms of the instrument, which 
could be costly if the original terms were optimal for non-tax reasons.  
With respect to Ex Post Complexity, a person affected by uncertain rules has two 
choices:
140
 (1) work to change applicable law in a way that reduces uncertainty or (2) 
accept a lack of understanding of the outcome of legal rules (and therefore accept the 
costs that follow from a failure to report activities properly or insure against such costs).  
Uncertainty contributes to Ex Post Complexity because, under either of these options, a 
person governed by uncertain law incurs costs. 
Under the first option, a person incurs costs in order to change applicable law.  
Under the second option, a person either accepts costs that follow from a failure to report 
activities properly or incurs insurance costs.  In tax, for example, a person could either 
accept the risk that his or her reported tax consequences will be successfully challenged 
(which could lead to penalties) or insure against that risk by, for example, obtaining an 
expensive legal opinion that could be one factor tending to provide some measure of 
protection against penalties in some circumstances.   
                                                             
139 See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text. 
140 Since the relevant actions have already been undertaken, modifying future activities is no longer 
an option. 





E. Factual Information Needed as a Contributing Factor 
A legal rule can contribute to Ex Ante Complexity or Ex Post Complexity if 
determining the proper application of the rule requires persons to gather information.  
This is only true, however, if the persons would not otherwise have the information 
readily available. 
VII. REFORMS WOULD SIMPLIFY LAW IN SOME RESPECTS AND, IN 
OTHER RESPECTS, MAKE LAW NO MORE COMPLEX 
Requiring all partnerships to use the remedial method under § 704(c) and making 
basis adjustments mandatory regardless of whether a partnership has made an election 
under § 754 would reduce or at least not increase Ex Ante Complexity and Ex Post 
Complexity.
141
  Lawmakers have resisted these reforms on the grounds that the reforms 
would impose burdensome complexity on unsophisticated partnerships.
142
  Thus, current 
law generally allows all partnerships to elect between using the most accurate method (in 
other words, the remedial method in the context of § 704(c) and basis adjustments in the 
context of § 754) and using a less accurate method.   
Current law is flawed for three reasons.  First, requiring partnerships to use the 
most accurate method would reduce, or at least not increase, Ex Ante Complexity.  
Second, requiring partnerships to use the most accurate method would reduce, or at least 
not increase, Ex Post Complexity.  Third, making the elections universally available 
ultimately bred more complexity. 
A. Requiring Partnerships to Use the Most Accurate Method Would 
Reduce, or at Least Not Increase, Ex Ante Complexity 
Judged under each of the factors that affect Ex Ante Complexity described above 
in Part VI, mandatory use of the most accurate method would reduce, or at least not 
increase, Ex Ante Complexity.  In terms of the first factor that affects Ex Ante 
Complexity, the current elective regime does not serve the purpose of allowing taxpayers 
to easily avoid an otherwise complex rule.  Regarding length, the proposed reforms 
would make law shorter.  With respect to the technical nature of rules, for unsophisticated 
taxpayers who do not consult tax advisors prior to engaging in transactions, the effect on 
Ex Ante Complexity is mitigated by the fact that the proposed reforms would lead to tax 
results more consistent with expectations.  For unsophisticated taxpayers who do consult 
tax advisors prior to engaging in transactions or for sophisticated taxpayers, the reforms 
do not increase the technical nature of rules.  The proposed reforms also reduce Ex Ante 
                                                             
141 Laura E. Cunningham & Noel B. Cunningham, Simplifying Subchapter K: the Deferred Sale 
Method, 51 SMU L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing that the deferred sale method, similar to the remedial method, 
would be preferable to current law and could significantly simplify current law).  See also Monroe, supra 
note 84 (making a similar argument).  For additional criticism of the current approach under § 754, see Karen 
C. Burke, Repairing Inside Basis Adjustments, 58 TAX LAW. 639 (2004).  This discussion of complexity is 
not intended to suggest that tax simplification is a goal that should be pursued without regard to other policy 
considerations, and, often tax simplification cannot be achieved without undermining other policy goals like 
fairness and prevention of tax abuse.  However, it is also not the case that tax simplification is always at odds 
with these other goals.  In the context of §§ 704(c) and 754, for example, the proposed reforms could 
simultaneously promote simplicity (or at least not make the law more complex) and further the goals of 
fairness and prevention of tax abuse.  For discussion of the impact of tax elections on these other goals, see 
supra note 117 and for discussion of the impact of the proposed reforms on these other goals, see supra Part 
V.    
142 See supra Parts II and IV. 




Complexity by reducing uncertainty.  Finally, the proposed reforms would not impose 
any additional information gathering requirements and, thus, would not increase Ex Ante 
Complexity in that respect.   
1.   Current law does not reduce Ex Ante Complexity by allowing 
taxpayers to easily avoid an otherwise complex rule 
Ex Ante Complexity plays a role at the time when taxpayers are deciding 
whether or not to engage in a given transaction.  In the context of §§ 704(c) and 754, for 
example, Ex Ante Complexity plays a role at the time that taxpayers are deciding whether 
or not to contribute property to a partnership, at the time that taxpayers are deciding 
whether or not a partnership should sell property, and at the time that a person is deciding 
whether or not to acquire an interest in a partnership.  Ex Ante Complexity is a measure 
of: (1) the costs that result from steps taken by taxpayers to ensure that the decisions they 
reach with respect to these transactions are the same decisions that they would reach if 
they fully understood the implications of relevant partnership tax law, and (2) the costs 
that result if the decisions that taxpayers reach with respect to these transactions are not 
the same decisions that they would reach if they fully understood the implications of 
relevant partnership tax law.    
The proposed reforms to § 704(c) could increase Ex Ante Complexity if either of 
the two types of costs listed above were lower under the current regime in which 
taxpayers are allowed to elect to use the traditional method (thereby avoiding the 
remedial method) than under a regime in which taxpayers were required to use the 
remedial method.  However, this is not the case.  Likewise, it is not the case that either of 
the two types of costs listed above would be lower under the current regime in which 
taxpayers are allowed to elect to avoid basis adjustments than under a regime in which 
taxpayers were required to make basis adjustments. 
Some taxpayers will obtain actual knowledge (either directly or through an 
advisor) of the consequences that will result from a prospective transaction under 
applicable partnership tax law.  These taxpayers incur the first type of cost related to Ex 
Ante Complexity described above (in other words, costs that result from steps taken by 
taxpayers to ensure that the decisions they reach are the same decisions that they would 
reach if they fully understood the implications of relevant partnership tax law).  These 
taxpayers are likely to be sophisticated taxpayers since they seek tax advice prior to 
engaging in a transaction and, therefore, they are not the type of taxpayers for whom 
lawmakers designed supposedly simple rules.  In any event, the proposed reforms would, 
if anything, reduce the costs incurred by these taxpayers.  In particular, if the remedial 
method under § 704(c) is required (or if partnerships are required to make basis 
adjustments), taxpayers or their advisors only need to predict the tax consequences of a 
prospective transaction that result from use of the remedial method (or that result if basis 
adjustments are made).  If multiple methods are allowed, taxpayers or their advisors need 
to predict the tax consequences that would follow from a prospective transaction under 
each method (or with and without basis adjustments).
143
  Consequently, the elective 
                                                             
143 This concern is true of many explicit elections that affect tax consequences.  See, e.g., Field, 
supra note 84, at 27–30 (describing how elections create complexity because taxpayers must analyze the 
benefits and burdens of various alternatives); Yin, supra note 117, at 130 (“[E]lections are inherently costly 
and complex for the taxpayer.  The taxpayer must incur the transaction cost of evaluating all tax 
consequences of available options before making an informed choice.”); Edward Yorio, The Revocability of 





nature of current law does not allow these taxpayers to reduce costs by avoiding the 
determination of results under the remedial method (or by avoiding the determination of 
results that follow when basis adjustments are made). 
Other taxpayers will make a decision regarding future transactions without 
obtaining actual knowledge (either directly or through an advisor) of the consequences 
that will result from the transactions under applicable partnership tax law.  Taxpayers that 
make decisions in this way are likely to be unsophisticated taxpayers and, therefore, 
precisely the type of taxpayers for whom lawmakers designed supposedly simple rules.  
Such taxpayers avoid the first type of cost related to Ex Ante Complexity (namely, costs 
that result from steps taken by taxpayers to ensure that the decisions they reach are the 
same decisions that they would reach if they fully understood the implications of relevant 
partnership tax law).  However, such taxpayers potentially incur the second type of cost 
related to Ex Ante Complexity (namely, costs that result if the decisions that taxpayers 
reach are not the same decisions that they would reach if they fully understood the 
implications of relevant partnership tax law).  A taxpayer who makes a decision without 
actual knowledge of partnership tax law will make the decision based on what he or she 
expects partnership tax law would provide.  Therefore, if partnership tax law provides for 
results that are more consistent with his or her expectations, he or she is less likely to 
incur the second type of cost related to Ex Ante Complexity.  As described below in Part 
VII.A.4, consistency with expectations is more likely to occur under the proposed 
reforms.   
2.   The proposed reforms would reduce Ex Ante Complexity by 
making applicable law shorter. 
 
Shortening applicable law reduces Ex Ante Complexity by making the tax 
consequences of future transactions easier to predict (at least for taxpayers who make 
such predictions based on actual knowledge of partnership tax law obtained directly or 
through an advisor).  The proposed reforms would reduce the length of applicable law.  
In particular, requiring all partnerships to use the remedial method and requiring all 
partnerships to make basis adjustments in all cases would reduce the length of applicable 
statutes and regulations.  This is the case since the reforms would obviate the need for 
provisions that: (1) describe other § 704(c) methods, (2) set forth the process for making 
a § 754 election, and (3) describe special rules that apply in the case of substantial built-
in losses.  Thus, the proposed reforms would reduce Ex Ante Complexity by making 
applicable law shorter. 
3.   The proposed reforms would not make the applicable rules 
meaningfully more technical for purposes of Ex Ante Complexity. 
 
Regarding the technical nature of rules, the remedial method may be slightly 
more computationally difficult than the traditional method.  Making basis adjustments is, 
admittedly, more computationally difficult than not making basis adjustments.  
Nevertheless, the proposed reforms would not increase Ex Ante Complexity. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Federal Tax Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 463-65 (1975) (describing how elections generally create 
complexity). See also Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L. REV. 365, 
371 (arguing that requiring partnerships to use the remedial method would “simplify the law by eliminating 
both any need for taxpayers to evaluate competing options and any need for any anti-abuse rule to disallow 
overly aggressive uses of the alternative rules.”).  See also supra note 129. 




As described above in Part VII.A.1, even under current law, a taxpayer who 
obtains actual knowledge of partnership tax law (either directly or through an advisor) in 
order to fully evaluate a prospective transaction must cope with the computational 
difficulty of the remedial method or the computational difficulty of making basis 
adjustments as part of the process of obtaining a complete picture of future tax 
consequences.  In other words, such a taxpayer would evaluate the tax consequences of 
the transaction under each of the available methods under § 704(c), including the 
remedial method.  Likewise, such a taxpayer would evaluate the tax consequences of a 
prospective transaction by assuming two alternative possibilities – one possibility that 
involves making basis adjustments and one possibility that involves not making basis 
adjustments.   Because such a taxpayer already evaluates the tax consequences that would 
follow from a transaction under the remedial method and under the assumption that basis 
adjustments are made, making the remedial method and basis adjustments mandatory 
would not exacerbate Ex Ante Complexity for such a taxpayer. 
Likewise, the proposed reforms would not exacerbate Ex Ante Complexity for a 
taxpayer who makes decisions without actual knowledge of applicable law.  This is so 
because the computational difficulty of applicable law has no effect on such a taxpayer‟s 
evaluation of future transactions.   
4.   The proposed reforms would lead to results that better conform 
to expectations. 
Whether or not rules conform to the expectations of affected persons is most 
relevant with respect to taxpayers who make decisions regarding future transactions 
without acquiring actual knowledge of applicable law (directly or through an adviser).  
When taxpayers have no actual knowledge of applicable law, their decisions about future 
transactions will be based on their uninformed expectations about what applicable law 
provides.  If these expectations are consistent with actual law, the decisions that the 
taxpayers make based on their expectations will be the same as decisions they would 
make if they had a complete and actual understanding of applicable law.  Therefore, if 
applicable law conforms to their expectations, these taxpayers will not incur the second 
type of cost related to Ex Ante Complexity (namely, costs that result if the decisions that 
taxpayers reach are not the same decisions that they would reach if they fully understood 
the implications of relevant law).  In addition, taxpayers who make decisions with respect 
to future transactions without acquiring actual knowledge of applicable law do not incur 
the first type of cost related to Ex Ante Complexity (namely, costs that result from steps 
taken by taxpayers to ensure that the decisions they reach are the same decisions that they 
would reach if they fully understood the implications of relevant law).  Consequently, Ex 




 it seems fair to conclude that most people who own 
partnership interests, if they gave the matter any thought, would expect that partners in a 
partnership would share tax items in a way that coincides with how they share economic 
gains and losses.  Compared to the traditional method, the remedial method leads to 
results more consistent with this expectation since the remedial method provides for 
sharing tax items in a way that better coincides with how partners share economic gain 
                                                             
144 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text. 





and loss, as demonstrated by the examples in Part I.  Similarly, basis adjustments lead to 
results more consistent with this expectation since basis adjustments result in each 
economic gain or loss generating only one matching tax gain or loss, as demonstrated by 
the examples in Part III.  Thus, the proposed reforms would lead to tax results that better 
conform to people‟s expectations and consequently would reduce Ex Ante Complexity 
for taxpayers who make decisions with respect to future transactions without acquiring 
actual knowledge of applicable law.  These taxpayers are more likely to be 
unsophisticated taxpayers and, therefore, precisely the type of taxpayers for whom 
lawmakers designed supposedly simple rules. 
5.   The proposed reforms would reduce uncertainty. 
The uncertainty inherent in applicable law can increase the costs associated with 
predicting the tax consequences of potential future transactions.  This effect will be most 
pronounced for taxpayers whose predictions are based on actual knowledge (obtained 
either directly or through an adviser) of applicable law.  Such taxpayers will tend to be 
sophisticated and, consequently, not the type of taxpayers for whom lawmakers designed 
supposedly simple rules.  In any event, the proposed reforms would decrease uncertainty, 
and therefore simplify the process of predicting the tax consequences of potential future 
transactions. 
Regarding § 704(c), in some cases, ambiguities can arise under the traditional 
method in situations in which they do not arise under the remedial method.  In other 
words, there are cases in which a complete and correct understanding of the Treasury 
Regulations does not lead to a clear tax result under the traditional method but does lead 
to a clear tax result under the remedial method.
145
  Regarding both §§ 704(c) and 754, the 
proposed reforms would mitigate uncertainty by reducing the number of instances in 
                                                             
145 For example, assume two individuals, A and B, form a new entity treated as a partnership for tax 
purposes.  A contributes land with a tax basis of $750 and a fair market value of $1000, and B contributes 
$1000 cash.  In a subsequent year, when the value of the land has increased to $1200, C contributes $2200 
cash for a 50% interest in the partnership (diluting A‟s interest to 25% and B‟s interest to 25%).  In a later 
year, the land is sold for $1100.  If the partnership uses the remedial method for making § 704(c) allocations 
and reverse § 704(c) allocations with respect to the land, then the amount of tax gain and loss that must be 
allocated to each partner is clear.  Under the remedial method, each partner is allocated tax gain and loss in an 
amount that matches net economic gain and loss.  Net economic gain realized by A is $325 which is made up 
of (i) $250 gain realized prior to contributing the land to the partnership (ii) 50% of the $200 gain that 
accrued subsequent to contributing the land to the partnership but prior to C joining the partnership and (iii) 
25% of the $100 loss that accrued after C joined the partnership.  Net economic gain realized by B is $75 
which is made up of (i) 50% of the $200 gain that accrued after the partnership was formed but prior to C 
joining the partnership and (ii) 25% of the $100 loss that accrued after C joined the partnership.  Net 
economic loss realized by C is $50 which consists of 50% of the $100 loss that accrued after C joined the 
partnership.  Consequently, tax items allocated to each partner under the remedial method are: $325 tax gain 
to A, $75 tax gain to B, and $50 tax loss to C.  The only item actually recognized by the partnership is $350 
of tax gain from sale of the land, but the partnership invents a notional item of $50 of tax loss and an 
offsetting notional item of $50 of tax gain, so that the partnership has, in total, the proper amounts of tax 
items to allocate ($400 of tax gain and $50 of tax loss).  The results if the partnership uses the traditional 
method for making § 704(c) and reverse § 704(c) allocations with respect to the land are not entirely clear.  
The only item that the partnership can allocate is $350 of tax gain.  None of the gain should be allocated to C 
since C realized a net economic loss.  However, it is not clear whether the tax gain should be allocated: (i) 
$75 to B (to fully match B‟s net economic gain) and $275 to A ($50 less than net economic gain realized), (ii) 
$25 to B ($50 less than net economic gain realized) and $325 to A (to fully match A‟s net economic gain) or 
(iii) in some combination that falls in between options (i) and (ii).    




which taxpayers might engage in transactions that raise the question of whether or not an 
inherently uncertain anti-abuse rule applies.
146
   
6.   The proposed reforms would not impose any incremental 
information gathering requirements. 
 
The factual information needed to predict the tax consequences of a potential 
transaction under the remedial method (or if basis adjustments are made) is either the 
same factual information needed to predict tax consequences of the potential transaction 
under the traditional method (or without basis adjustments) or is information that the 
parties would have in any event.  Consequently, the proposed reforms would not increase 
Ex Ante Complexity by imposing any additional information gathering requirements.   
B. Requiring partnerships to use the most accurate method would reduce, or 
at least not increase, Ex Post Complexity. 
 
Judged under each of the factors that affect Ex Post Complexity described above 
in Part VI,
147
 mandatory use of the remedial method and mandatory basis adjustments 
would reduce, or at least not increase, Ex Post Complexity.  In terms of the first factor 
that affects Ex Post Complexity, the current elective regime does not serve the purpose of 
allowing taxpayers to easily avoid an otherwise complex rule.  Regarding length, the 
proposed reforms would make law shorter.  With respect to the technical nature of rules, 
the effect on Ex Post Complexity of any increase in computational difficulty would be 
mitigated by technological advances.  The proposed reforms also reduce Ex Post 
Complexity by reducing uncertainty.  Finally, the proposed reforms would not impose 
any additional information gathering requirements and, thus, would not increase Ex Post 
Complexity in that respect.   
1.   Current law does not allow taxpayers to easily avoid an 
otherwise complex rule. 
Current law appears to be designed in an attempt to reduce Ex Post Complexity 
by reducing the frequency with which computationally difficult rules apply.  In particular, 
the goal of current law is apparently to allow taxpayers to avoid the computational 
difficulty associated with the remedial method in favor of the supposedly lesser 
computational difficulty associated with the traditional method and to allow taxpayers to 
avoid the computational difficulty associated with basis adjustments.
148
  However, 
current law fails to meet this goal for two reasons.  First, as a practical matter, the 
computational difficulty associated with the remedial method is no greater than the 
computational difficulty associated with the traditional method, and the computational 
difficulty associated with making basis adjustments is no greater than the computational 
difficulty of failing to do so for the reasons discussed in Part VII.B.3 below.  Second, the 
                                                             
146 Anti-abuse rules are inherently uncertain because they are, by their nature, open-ended.  Also, 
there are a number of unanswered questions regarding the anti-abuse rule in the § 704(c) Regulations.  See 
supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
147 Conformity to expectations is not discussed in connection with Ex Post Complexity because Ex 
Post Complexity involves evaluating and reporting tax consequences of transactions that have already 
occurred.  Accurately reporting tax consequences requires actual knowledge of applicable tax law.  
Therefore, expectations of uninformed taxpayers are not particularly relevant, except to the extent that 
applicable tax law is easier to interpret when it conforms to expectations. 
148 See supra Parts II, IV. 





elective nature of the rules does not result in taxpayers avoiding the computational 
difficulty that would be undertaken if taxpayers were required to use the remedial method 
or make basis adjustments. 
This second point requires further elaboration.  As discussed above,
149
 a rule that 
might otherwise be complex is not, in fact, complex when people can take 
straightforward steps to avoid application of the rule.  In theory, this proposition would 
suggest that, if the remedial method truly led to more onerous computations than the 
traditional method, then giving taxpayers the option to elect the traditional method would 
reduce Ex Post Complexity.  In practice, however, providing for an elective regime 
exacerbates Ex Post Complexity because not only do taxpayers (or more accurately, their 
advisors) not avoid the work that would be required to compute results under the 
remedial method, but they also take on the work that would be required to compute 
results under the traditional method and the work of choosing between the two.  In other 
words, if one method is required, partnerships (or their advisors) only need to apply that 
method.  If multiple methods are allowed and if partnerships desire to make an informed 
choice about which method to use, partnerships (or their advisors) need to understand 
how all of the methods operate in order to select the method under which the results will 
be reported.
150
  Furthermore, under an elective regime, the Service must devote resources 
necessary to cope with taxpayers using different methods rather than one method. 
The conclusion that the elective regime does not produce simplification can be 
more fully illustrated in the context of § 704(c) and § 754. 
a. Section 704(c) 
It is possible to imagine a scenario under which the elective regime would 
produce simplification, if the computational difficulty associated with the traditional 
method truly was lower than the computational difficulty associated with the remedial 
method.  In particular, one might imagine that a partnership that values simplification 
over the possibility of achieving an optimal tax outcome would attain simplicity by 
automatically opting for the traditional method, if it were associated with lower 
computational difficulty, rather than analyzing the results under all possible methods.  
However, as a practical matter, this scenario is highly unlikely to occur. 
First, properly reporting tax consequences that follow under the traditional 
method (like many other aspects of partnership tax law) requires sufficient technical 
expertise such that it is unlikely that an unsophisticated partnership would apply the 
traditional method without accounting or legal assistance.  Second, once an 
unsophisticated partnership seeks accounting or legal advice, it is likely that the 
accountant or lawyer will analyze the impact of all available methods.  For one thing, the 
expert may be aware of the fact that reporting under the remedial method is no more 
difficult than doing so under the traditional method, so the remedial method should not be 
discarded out of hand.  For another, the expert may be motivated by other factors such as 
a concern that a failure to provide advice about all realistic, available options could lead 
to the risk of a malpractice claim. 
 
                                                             
149 See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text. 
150 This concern is true of many explicit elections that affect tax consequences.  See supra note 143.  




b. Section 754 
As is the case regarding § 704(c), an unsophisticated partnership may rely on an 
expert to analyze the question of whether or not to make a § 754 election.
151
  In order to 
mitigate the risk of a malpractice claim, for example, the expert likely assesses both 
options.
152
   
2.   The proposed reforms would make the law shorter. 
Regarding length, as discussed above,
153
 requiring all partnerships to use the 
remedial method and requiring all partnerships to make basis adjustments in all cases 
would reduce the length of applicable statutes and regulations.  Thus, the proposed 
reforms would reduce Ex Post Complexity by shortening applicable law that must be 
analyzed by persons in order to properly report tax consequences. 
 
3.   The proposed reforms would not make the applicable rules 
meaningfully more technical. 
 
Regarding the technical nature of rules, the remedial method may be slightly 
more computationally difficult than the traditional method in that it can involve more 
extensive bookkeeping.  Making basis adjustments is, admittedly, more computationally 
difficult than not making basis adjustments.  However, with respect to Ex Post 
Complexity, these effects are mitigated because any additional computations can be 
automated.  Likely, the fact that any computations can now be automated through the use 
of computer programs is a fact that the Senate had in mind when it stated that the elective 
nature of basis adjustments is “anachronistic.”154  Thus, the proposed reforms would not 




                                                             
151 The question of whether to make a § 754 election to some extent involves Ex Ante Complexity.  
Once the election is made, it will generally apply to all transfers of partnership interests that occur during the 
taxable year with respect to which the election was filed and any future taxable years.  I.R.C. § 754 (2010).  
Therefore, making the election affects tax consequences of transactions that will happen in future years.  
However, despite the fact that the decision to make the election is, to some extent, forward-looking, even 
unsophisticated taxpayers may benefit from expert advice in connection with making the decision.  This is 
the case because, at the time that the expert is consulted to evaluate how to report the tax consequences of the 
sale of a partnership interest, the expert may alert the unsophisticated partnership to the need to make a 
decision about whether or not to make a § 754 election. 
152 Moreover, if the expert does take a short cut in the analysis, it is likely that the expert would opt 
for automatically making the § 754 election (even though that is more computationally difficult).  Under 
current law, if the election is made then: (i) tax gains will not be duplicated and (ii) tax losses will not be 
duplicated.  See supra Part III.  If the election is not made then (i) tax gains will be duplicated and (ii) tax 
losses will not be duplicated (unless they are not captured by the substantial built-in loss rules).  See supra 
Part III.  Therefore, if a shortcut is used in evaluating whether or not to make the election, the result will 
likely be making the election since (i) it avoids duplication of gains (which is better than what happens if the 
election is not made) and (ii) losses might not be duplicated in any event. 
153 See supra Part VII.A.2. 
154 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 





4.   The proposed reforms would reduce uncertainty. 
As described above,
155
 mandatory use of the remedial method and mandatory 
basis adjustments would decrease uncertainty.  With respect to the remedial method, this 
is true because there are cases in which ambiguities can arise under the traditional method 
when they would not arise under the remedial method.
156
  In addition, both mandatory 
use of the remedial method and mandatory basis adjustments would mitigate uncertainty 
by reducing the number of instances in which taxpayers undertake transactions that raise 
the question of whether or not an inherently uncertain anti-abuse rule applies.
157
 
As discussed above, reduced uncertainty decreases Ex Ante Complexity because 
it is easier to decide whether or not to engage in a transaction when it is easier to predict 
the tax consequences of that transaction.  Likewise, reduced uncertainty decreases Ex 
Post Complexity by making it easier to evaluate how to report a transaction once it has 
occurred. 
5.   The proposed reforms would not impose any incremental 
information gathering requirements. 
Regarding §§ 704(c) and 754, partnerships should already have all the 
information they would need to report tax results under the proposed reforms.  Therefore, 
the proposed reforms would not affect this factor contributing to Ex Post Complexity. 
In the context of § 704(c), one of the reasons the A.L.I. expressed concern about 
adopting a method similar to the remedial method was that it would require partnerships 
to value assets when they are contributed to a partnership.  However, contrary to the view 
the A.L.I. seemed to espouse,
158
 a partnership would need to value an asset at the time of 
contribution to the partnership even if the partnership was using the traditional method 
for making § 704(c) allocations.
159
  In addition, a partnership needs to value an asset at 
the time it is contributed to a partnership in order to effectuate the economic deal among 
the partners.  If A and B form a partnership, where A contributes land to the partnership, 
B contributes cash to the partnership, and the partners intend to share equally in the 
economic returns of the partnership, the partners will need to value the land in order to 
                                                             
155 See supra Part VII.A.5. 
156 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
159 The A.L.I. indicated that, under a method like the traditional method, the partnership only needs 
to know the sales price and the basis of an asset to properly allocate tax items.  Id.  This is simply untrue.  To 
illustrate, assume A owns a piece of land that A acquired some time ago for $5,000.  A contributes the land 
and B contributes cash to the newly formed AB partnership, each in exchange for a 50% interest in the AB 
partnership.  Assume the partnership sells the land for $10,000 in year 1.  The partnership would recognize 
$5,000 of tax gain from sale of the land.  Assume the partnership uses the traditional method under § 704(c) 
for purposes of making tax allocations with respect to the land.  If the land was worth $7,000 when A 
contributed it to the partnership, then the $5,000 tax gain should be allocated $1,500 to B (B‟s 50% share of 
the $3,000 increase in value of the land that occurred after it was contributed to the partnership) and $3,500 
to A (A‟s 50% share of the $3,000 increase in value of the land that occurred after it was contributed to the 
partnership plus the $2,000 increase in value that occurred before it was contributed to the partnership).  If 
the land was worth $12,000 when A contributed it to the partnership, then the proper tax allocations are quite 
different.  In particular, all $5,000 of the tax gain should be allocated to A.  In summary, simply knowing the 
sales price and the basis of the land is not enough to determine the proper tax allocations under the traditional 
method because the proper tax allocations also depend on the value of the property at the time it was 
contributed to the partnership. 




determine how much cash B should contribute.
160
  Likewise, in the case of reverse 
§ 704(c) allocations, a partnership needs to value its assets at the time new partners join 
the partnership in order to determine how much the new partners must contribute for a 
given interest in the partnership. 
C. Making the elections universally available ultimately bred more 
complexity. 
As discussed above, current law does not promote simplicity for unsophisticated 
partnerships relative to what would result if the law required all partnerships to use the 
remedial method and make basis adjustments.  However, even if current law did promote 
simplicity for unsophisticated partnerships, only unsophisticated partnerships should be 
allowed to elect the less accurate (supposedly less complex) method.  Instead of limiting 
use of the less accurate method to unsophisticated partnerships, the ability to elect the 
less accurate method is universally available.  In the context of § 704(c), until 1984, 
universal availability meant allowing all partnerships to avoid applying current § 704(c) 
principles if they so chose.  After 1984, it meant allowing all partnerships to use the 
traditional method under § 704(c) rather than the more accurate remedial method.  In the 
context of § 754, until 2004, universal availability meant granting all partnerships the 
option of avoiding making basis adjustments.  After 2004, it meant giving all partnerships 
the flexibility to avoid making basis adjustments except in cases where a substantial 
built-in loss exists. 
The universal availability of the elections may reflect oversimplification.  In 
particular, perhaps lawmakers took the view that it would be simpler to make the 
elections universally available than to attempt to distinguish between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated partnerships.  Moreover, lawmakers may have felt justified in doing so 
since partnerships were historically viewed as entities used by unsophisticated 
taxpayers.
161
   
However, as Professor David Weisbach has argued, lawmakers cannot design tax 
law based on the most common fact pattern.
162
  Professor Weisbach explains why doing 
so would be problematic: “Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become 
common as taxpayers discover how to take advantage of them.”163  In other words, 
designing tax law with the typical case in mind results in an unstable system since what 
was the atypical case will become more typical as taxpayers adjust their transactions to 
take the rules into account.   
                                                             
160 Professor Monroe observes that, following the promulgation of the substantial economic effect 
regulations (which occurred after the A.L.I. issued its report), valuing property at the time of contribution was 
necessary in order for a partnership to maintain capital accounts in accordance with the substantial economic 
effect regulations.  Monroe, supra note 84, at 1433–34.  Yet, even prior to the issuance of these regulations, 
partnerships would need to value contributed property in order to properly carry out their economic deal.  The 
A.L.I. report posited a hypothetical in which multiple partners each contribute property to a partnership that 
is not easy to value but the partners agree to treat the value of each parcel of property as equal.  See 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE 
RULES FOR TAXATION OF PARTNERS pt. F(D) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1979).  However, it is not clear how the 
partners would agree that the value of the properties were equal without having some reliable estimate of the 
value of each piece of property. 
161 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
162 David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 (1999). 
163 Id .at 869. 





In the context of §§ 704(c) and 754, partnerships might have originally been used 
by unsophisticated taxpayers who would use the elections, if at all, for the intended 
purpose of simplification.  However, partnership tax rules designed with unsophisticated 
taxpayers in mind encouraged sophisticated taxpayers to form partnerships so that they 
could use the elections for the unintended purpose of tax liability reduction.  Over time, 
the unintended purpose became the more typical use of the rules.  Lawmakers took action 
to limit the ability to use the rules for the unintended purpose (by adopting anti-abuse 
rules), and anti-abuse rules increased complexity by increasing uncertainty and the length 
of applicable law.  The end result is a system that may be more complex than what would 
have existed if lawmakers had limited the availability of the election to unsophisticated 
partnerships.  Furthermore, because the election does not further simplicity for 
unsophisticated partnerships, current law is more complex that what would have resulted 
if lawmakers had required use of the remedial method and required basis adjustments in 
all cases.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Rules intended to simplify partnership tax law in order to cater to Mom and Pop 
partnerships have sometimes had the opposite effect – complicating partnership tax law 
and inadvertently catering to sophisticated partnerships by increasing opportunities for 
tax planning and abuse.  In place of current law, reforms suggested by this paper would 
simplify partnership tax law, as shown by an examination of how tax rules can best 
promote simplicity.  In addition, the reforms would reduce the potential for tax revenue 
loss and unfairness inherent under current rules.   
